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CLYDE G. NELSON 
Attorney at Law 
172 South Main Street 
P.O. BOX 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Telephone: (208) 547-2135 
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136 
Idaho State Bar No. 1197 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE, 1 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, ) 
and Scott Beckstead, Individually ) 
) CASE NO. CV-2006-390 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs . ) AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BALLS 
) IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
CITY OF PRESTON, 1 JUDGMENT 
) 
Defendant. ) 
. )  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ) 
COMES NOW John Balls, upon oath duly deposes and says: 
1. I am the Director of Public Works for the City of Preston, Idaho. 
2. 1 have worked for the City of Preston, Idaho, for a period in excess of five years, 
and am fully familiar with the Creamery Hollow Subdivision, and the waterline 
improvements constructed by Beckstead on 800 East Street. 
3. 1 have measured the length of the 12-inch waterline installed by Beckstead on 800 
East Street. It is 1, 650 feet long, not 1,700 feet long as clailned by Mr. 
Beckstead. 
4. The cost to the city for connections to the waterline in 2004 was an average of 
$2,618.07 for each connection. The cost of connections in 2007 averages 
$3,349.40 per connection. Darrell Wilburn, City Engineer, Jerry Larsen, City 
Clerk, and I computed those figures, and they are based upon material costs, costs 
of labor, costs of use of equipment, supervision, and costs of administration. (See 
Exhibit B to Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn.) 
DATED this &$day of June, 2007. 
AAB& 
to before me this & day of b e  ,2007 
k. l Z 0 R . A  
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at P- 10 
Comm. Expires 7 - 15.aol o 
CLYDE G. NELSON 
Attorney at Law 
172 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Telephone: (208) 547-2135 
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136 
Idaho State Bar No. 1197 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE, ) 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, ) 
and Scott Beckstead, Individually ) 
) CASE NO. CV-2006-390 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs . 1 AFFIDAVIT OF DARRELL 
) WILBURN IN SUPPORT OF 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 




COMES NOW Darrell Wilbum, upon oath duly deposes and says: 
1. I was the City Engineer for the City of Preston, Idaho, during all periods relevant 
to the action filed by the Plaintiff Scott Becltstead, and retired from my position 
with the City in 2007. 
2. I know Scott Beckstead, and am fully familiar with the Creamery Hollow 
Subdivision. 
3. Pursuant to § 16.28, Preston Municipal Code, a subdivider is required to have at 
least a 6-inch water main supplying his subdivision. 
4. Scott Becltstead had three alternatives for connecting a 6-inch line to city water 
mains at the time he developed the subdivision. He could have either: 
1. Waited until the City completed its 10-inch waterloop project. 
2. Replace 1,000 feet of existing 4-inch water main with a 6-inch water main on 
Oneida Street. 
3. Extend the existing 6-inch water main on 800 East Street a distance of 1650- 
1700 feet. 
Mr. Beckstead chose Option 3 
Creamery Hollow Subdivision has 22 lots which were benefitted from the 
installation of the waterline improvements along 800 East Street. 
The City decided to "oversize" the 6-inch waterline to a 12-inch waterline. 
Beckstead asserted he had installed a total of 1,700 feet of 12-inch line. Of this, 
460 feet were supplied by the City of Preston, and Beckstead would have supplied 
1,240 feet. 
After completion of the improvements in October, 2003, Scott Martin, Director of 
Public Works, and 1 computed the aniount that Mr. Beckstead would be 
reimbursed. I prepared a document showing the anlount of reimbursement to be 
$7,461.00. A copy of said document is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit " A .  
It is my understanding that Beckstead was reimbursed for the "oversizing". 
The cost to the City for labor and materials for installation of a service connection 
in 2004 was an average of $2,618.07. The cost for a connection in 2007 is an 
average of $3,349.40. I computed the figures in the cost of connection of a 
service line with the assistance of John Balls, present Director of Public Works, 
and Jeny Larsen, City Clerk. A summary of those costs is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "B". 
In October, 2004, Beckstead discussed with me possible reimbursement for the 
intervening connections which had been made to the waterline. I did not advise 
him that this was the type of situation for which §16.28.030B was written or ' 
suggest that he request reimbursement from the City as alleged in 79 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. I merely told him that if he thought he had a claim he should discuss 
it with the City Clerk. Beckstead did not advise me of the labor or materials which 
he allegedly had furnished or the amount he thought was owing. 
I am personally aware that only five additional connections have been made by 
intervening property owners since the construction of the waterline. Of these, four 
were made in October, 2004, and one was made in November, 2004. 
Never, at any time during the filing of the preliminary plat, filing of the final plat, 
recording of the same, or during the period that Beckstead constructed the 800 
East improven~ents, until one year later in October, 2004, did Beckstead ever 
mention §16.28.030B, Preston Municipal Code, or ever state to me that he might 
be entitled to reimbursement for intervening connections. 
k 
DATED this E d a y  of June, 2007. 
& 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this f i  day of 
Creamery Hollow Subdivision - 0111 East Water Line 
Item Description Quanity 6" Unit" 12" Unit 6" Cost ' 12" Cost Difference 
1 Subdividers Plpe 1240 $3.27 $10.50 $4,054.00 $13,020.00 $8,865.20 
2 City Supplied Pipe 460 $3.27 $0.00 $1,504.20 $0.00 ($1,504.20) 
3 Valves 0 $356.66 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
4 Saddre & Tap 0 $433.85 $0.00 . $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
Differences 
Residential Water Connactjon Fee 2004 
Cost Anayeis 
Per Hwr Qlranrty 
Application & Account 
Rev& 
$27.15 1 S27.15 
. .- .- . 
PW Dimtar 
City Engineer 
Equipment Hr. Rate Hr. 
Bsck Hoe 875.50 5 
Dump Truck 333.00 4 
Loader $76.50 1 
Service Truck 545.00 4 
Pickup $31.50 4 
Asphalt saw ' 818.00 1 
Jack Hammer & Compressor $48.50 i 
Hole s w  $6.00 . 0.5 
Tapping tools 39.00 0.5 
Patch Tmck $63.00 3 
Compacior $18.00 0.5 
Hand tools 8 Persona! Equip sg.00 t ea 
Labor 
Superviscr 527.15 'l 
Licenced Water Operators 327.15 4 
Roadway wrkars  527.15 6 
Traffic Ccr,trcller St7.15 1 
Backhoe operator 527.15 5 
Loader Oparatcr $27.15 f 
Materials 
Gravel Is 4 CY $44.00 
Asphat Patch Is ICY S60.00 
Meter Assemble (1)  Is 1 ea $270.07 
S % N ~ C ~  Line (1 )  Is t ea S99.00 
Conn-n fitting (1) Is 1 ea $125.C6 
Miscellanious shop materialsk 1 ea 525.00 
Freight !a 1 ea $50.00 
Total 92.61 8.07 
EXHIBIT "B-1" 
NCLS;~~ A L I ~  ~ n h  BZHZ-ZSH-aBZ ,:e :Qt Lccz /L t jb?  
ResiderrMI Water Conneeljon Fee 
Cast AnsJysis 
Per Hour auanity 
Application 8 Account W.17 
Review 
1 $30.17 
P W  Dtrector $30. t 7 0.5 $15.08 
Civ Engineer $48.00 0.5 524.50 
Equipment Hr Rsta Hr. 
Back Hoe $85.00 
Dump Tru& 870.00 
Loader . $85.00 
Service Truck $50.00 
Pickup $35.50 . 
Asphait saw SZ0.W 
Jack Hammer & Ccmpresso~ ~5.00 
Hole ssw 510.00 
Tapping took S10.00 
Patch T~ck STO.00 
Compactor 520.00 
Hand toals 8 Pemnal Equip $10.00 1 ea 
Labor 
Supervisor $30.17 
Licsnced Water Operators S30.77 
Roadway workers 530.17 
Traffic Controller $30.17 
Backhoe operator 530.17 
Loader Operator $30.17 
Materials 
Gravel Is 
Asphait Patch Is 
4 CY 
Meter h s s m b i e  ( I )  IS 
1 9  
1 ea 
Service Line (1) Is l e a  
Conneaon Mng (1) Is I ea 
Miscelianious 6hop rnaierialsls 1 ea 
Frei~ht :s 1 ea 
EXHIBIT "B-2" 
NC1S?be 213 $11:; 
- mb. 0Z8I-ZS8-80Z i 0  :Qt L M B Z / ~  T/*d 
CLYDE G. NELSON 
F I L E D  
Attorney at Law 
172 South Main Street 07 JUN 2 1 hlf fa: 2 1 
P.0. BOX 797 ; .. ,.. , ~ , \ ~ ~ . ; , ~ - ~ ; :  8:,<:;,,?;;-c'y' C L E R K  
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Telephone: (208) 547-2135 
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136 
Idaho State Bar No. 1197 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE, 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE, ) 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, ) 
and Scott Beckstead, Individually ) 
) CASE NO. CV-2006-390 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs . ) AFFIDAVIT OF CLYDE G. 
) NELSON IN SUPPORT OF 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 




COMES NOW Clyde G. Nelson, upon oath duly deposes and says: 
1. I am the attorney for the City of Preston, Idaho and have served continuously in 
that position since the early 1990's. 
2. I know Scott Beckstead and sun familiar with the Creamery Hollow Subdivision. 
3. Tltere are 22 lots within the Creamery Hollow Subdivision. The Plaintiff 
Beckstead has sold all lots within the subdivision. (Answer to Interrogatory No. 8, 
Answers to Defendant's Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents, 
Exhibit "A", attached hereto). 
4. The Plaintiff Beckstead has made a profit from the sale of his lots within the 
subdivision after taking in to account all expenses and costs associated with the 
development of the subdivision, including the costs of installing the pipeline on 
800 East Street. (Supplemental Answer to Interrogatory No. 9, PlaintifPs 
Supplemental Answer to Defendant's Interrogatories and Request for Production 
of Documents, Exhibit "B" attached hereto) 
5. Beckstead was fully aware of the amounts that he had expended for installation, 
materials, and labor of the 800 East waterline as he had received a bill from 
Irrigation Aid Co. for 1,060 feet of 12-inch pipeline dated November 4,2003, an 
invoice from WR White Supply for 180 feet of 12-inch pipeline dated October 27, 
2003, and a bill from Gary's Backhoe Service for excavation work and back-fill 
dated November 10, 2003. Said docunents were submitted by Plaintiff in 
Respo~lse to Defendant's Request for Production of Documents aiid are attached 
hereto as Exhibit "C". 
DATED this &day of June, 2007 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this f i  day o f J w  ,2007 
,,\\\lD'~~'1111/ ,,, 
,*st 3 .%@&* %, *" *,,.. """ " *;.' "'. .+ s *$ *OTA$', .$Pg 
3 :  %:% 3 Notary Public fod Idaho 
3 i-I = 
0 % - : Residing at Grace s :. t *  
% 'u8l\e.& g Cornm. Expires /a'($' 20/2- % *..-. %*4w&,.$6:*#4 
~@~II~"I,I~I~* 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please state the number of lots located within 
Creamery Hollow Subdivision that you have sold, the name, address and telephone 
number of each person to whom you have sold the same, the sales price of each lot to 
that person, and the total sum you have received for sale of said lots. l'
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Plaintiffs object to Interrogatory No. 8 " 
as requesting information that is irrelevant and immaterial and not leading to 
information within the scope of this form of discovery. Further, revealing the actual 
purchase price paid for each lot would require divulging information that would be 
considered confidential by the Buyers of such lots. Without waiving said objection, 




2 1 Larry Ralphs - 85 West Hwy, Clifton, ID 
Answers of Defendant's interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents 
E X H I B I T  "A-1" 
Tel. # 















Page - 8 
852-0532 
3 I Layne Harris - 136 North I5'West, Preston, ID 1 852-1528 
Dean lnman - 621 East 145 South, Preston, ID 
Sheldon coburn - 9313 North Hwy 34, Preston, ID 
Dean lnman - 621 East 145 South - Preston, ID 
Vince Whitehead - 85 West Is' South, Clifton, ID 
Richard Nuffer - 615 East 60 South, Preston, ID 
Ross Smith - 69 North I" East, Preston, ID 
John Burg - 624 East 60 South, Preston, ID 
Vince Whitehead - 85 West 1" South, Clifton, ID 
Steve Foster - 103 N. Bear River Bluff, Preston, ID 
Ken Morrison - Unknown, Salt Lake City, UT 
Jess EIgan -27 North 100 West, Preston, ID 
Vinoe Whitehead - 85 West 1" South, Clifton, ID 





















Layne Nielson - 131 South 600 East, Preston, ID 
Dean lnman - 621 East 145 South, Preston, ID 
Todd Garbett- 643 East 145 South, Preston, ID 
Cameron Whitehead - 650 East 145 South, Preston. ID 
Michael Rawlings - 624 East 145 South, Preston, ID 







STEVEN R. FULLER - 2995 
Steven R. Fuller Law Office 
24 North State 
P.O. Box 191 
Pietton, ID 83263 
Telephone: (208) 852-2680 
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
SCOTT 0ECKSTEP.D REAL ESTATE 
COR/?PANY and SCOTT BECKSTEAD. 
an individual, 
Defendant. I 
CASE NO. CV-06-390 
Pla:ntiffs, 
vs . 
CITY OF PRESTON, 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: As part of yoursaies price for purchasers of property 
within Creamery i-:ollow Siibdivisian, did you include tbe cost of installation of the waterline 
on 8" East Street. If your answer is "yes", please state the amount which you included in 
tine lot price as par: of the purchase price for compensation or reimbursement for 
installation of said wa:er!ine. 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO 
DEFENDANT'S 1NTERROGATORlES 
AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTlON 
OF DOCUMENTS 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Although I did not -- 
determine a specific amount as an expense to include in the purchase price of each loi of 
Creamery Hollow Subdivision for the installation of the water line on 600 East, I did pay all 
of the expenses and costs associated with the development of the subdivisian, including 
Suppi%mer;tal Answer of Defendant's lnterrogstories and 
Requests for Production of Documents Page - I 
EXHIBIT "B-1" 
the costs of installing the pipeline alon(; 830 East, and I did make a profit from the sale of 
lots in the subdivision. I also .took into account !hat the Preston City Ordinance provided 
for reimbursement of the pipeline costs over a five-year per:od, anticipating that some 
water connections would be made to the pipeline I had installed. The City's failure to 
reimburse those Costs pursuant to its ordinance had a direct impact on the net profit I 
nqticipated from ihe developme~t. 
DATED this &p$gy of May, 2007. 
/ 
STEVEN R. FULLER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
STATE OF IDA30 
County of Ftanklin 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, being firs:duly worn  on oath, deposes and says: 
That ha is a Flalnt;ff and repres~ntstivt: of Scoa 6ecics:ead F?eal Estate Company, in the above- 
eniit:ed act:on; thathe has reed thcfore~cing Complaintand knows the contents:hereof: ihatthe same is true 
of his olAn knowledge except as to matters stated therein on his information and Sciiof and as lo thosa matters 
he believes :hem :o be true. 
C t i c r .  
SUBSCRIBED .&ED SWQRN !o baloru me l h i s g d a y  ot Pilay, 2007. 
Residing at: Preston, Idaho 
Comm. Exp.: li21111 
Supplemental Answer of Defendant's Interrogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents Page - 2 
EXHIBIT "B-2" 
IRRIGATION AID C0MPA.N~ JC. 
472 No& State 
Preston, ID 83263 
Bill To 
Beckstead Scott 
3?. West Onieida Street 
Preston JD. 83263 
Invoice 
Ship To 
32 West Onieida Street 
Preston ID. 63263 
1 1 1  Subtotal %11,j64.60 
EXHIBIT "C-1" a\ 3 
04/02/07 15:15 FAX 801 626 7 - .-. - mITE SUPPLY 
BILL TO: 
BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE CO. 
32 W. ONEIDA 
PRESTON, ID 83263 
U R WHITE SUPPLY 
F i  le#7247?'-210 BOX 6ROOD 
SHIP TO: 
BECKSTERn REAL ESTATE CO. 
800 east 100 north 
PRESTON, ID 83263 
GARY'S 6ACKH3E SERVICE 
4709 W. 1200 N, 
ir?AHO 83232 - 588842 
(ZDP,) 747-3243 
1 
City, State, Zip 1 
E X H I B I T  "6-3" 
n 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT.OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR'THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
* * * * + "  
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, 
PlaintiFf(s), 
CITY OF PRESTON, a M~~nicipal 
Corporation, 
Case No. CV-2006-390 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
BATE: June 28,2007 
APPEARANCES: Steven R. Fuller, Attorney for Plaintiff 
Clyde G. Nelson, Attorney for DeTendant - via telephone 
MATTER BEFORE THE COURT: Motion lo Continue 
PROCEEDINGS: At the outset the Court heard oral argument from respective counsel 
regarding said motion. After consideration the Court GRANTED the motion and ordered 
that the Motion for Summary Judgment previously set for July 12Ih shall be moved to July 
2dh, 2007 at 1 :30 p.m. The parties agreed that a Reply Metnorandurn shall be due July 
2?fd. 
MINUTE ENTRY'AND ORDER- 1 
DATED: June 28,2007 
$J& 
DON L, HARDiNG 
District Judge !Y 
I hereby certify that on July 2, 2007, 1 mailed/servedlfaxed a true copy of the 
foregoing document on the attorney(s)lperson(s) listed below by mail with correct 
postage thereon or causing the same to be hand delivered. 
Steven R. Fuller 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Clyde G. i\lelson 
Attorney for Defendant 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- 2 
. .  , A *  ,*., 
Method of Service: 
Faxed to: 852-2683 
Faxed to: 547-21 36 
V, ELLIOTT LARSEN, Clerk 
BY: 
l iAX NO. ZUi3 851 LY"h P. UUl/UUS 
07 JUL - 5 ,  R t l  lo: 54 
; ; , I  ' ;; i:i . , i '{ x;LERX 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE"' 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN--- - 
* * * * * I  
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, 
CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipql 
Corporation, 
Case No. CV-2006-390 
ORDER FOR TRIAL, PRETRIAL 
SCHEDULE, AND PRETRIAL 
CONFERENCE 
AMENDED 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
* * TRIAL SCIIEDULE ' ' 
This cause is set for trial schedule as follows: 
DATE: January 8-9,2008 TIME: 9:00 a.m. 
PLACE: Franklin County Courthouse 
SETTING POSITION: I *' 
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF DAYS: 2 days 
PRETRIAL: - 
DATE: December 13,2007 TIME: 1:30 p.m. 
PLACE: Franklin Cotrnty Courthouse 
CVEI-ORDER FOR TRIAL, PRETRIAL 
SCHEDULE 6. PRETRIAL CONFERENCE - 'I 
I I ' 8  &70 ' nh i  
DATED this 28"' day of June, 2007. 
DON L. HARDlNG &* 
I 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE - OF MAlLlNGlSERVlCE 
I hereby certify that on the 3"l day of July, 2007, 1 mailedlserved a trite copy of the 
foregolng document on the attorney(s)/person(s) listed below by mail with conect postage 
thereon or causing the same to be hand delivered. 
Steven Fuller 
Attorney for Plainilff 
Clyde Nelson 
Attorney for Defendant 
CVEI-ORDER FOR TRIAL, PRETRIAL 
SCHEDULE & PRETPlAL CONFERENCE- 2 
Method of Service: 
Faxcd 
Faxed 
* ' APPENDIX A TO TRIAL ORDER"' 
1. MULTIPLE SETTINGS: 
In the event of multiple settings for the same date and time, it is the responsibility of 
counsel to inform tiiemselves of their position upon the trial calendar. In the event a 
case cannot be tried on the date indicated, every effort will be made to reset at the 
earliest date available to court and the parties. 
2. SCHEDULING CONFLICTS; 
Requested continuance of trial setting because of pre-existing scheduling conflict 
shall be by written motion, state specifically the details of the conflict, and be filed 
within 14 davs hereof. 
Requests and/or stipiiiations for continuances for other than pre-existing conflicts 
must be in writing, state the specific reason therefore, be D r o v e d  bv the e m ,  
propose mutually agreeable times for rescheduling, and are subject to approval by 
the court. 
3. SETTLEMENT: 
in the event of settiornent of this cause prior to trial, NOTICE SHALL BE GIVEN TO 
THE JUDGE AND TO THE CLERK OF THE COURT FORTHWITH. Expenses of 
the jury incurred because lack OF reasonable notice will be assessed to the 
responsible party or parties. 
* * PRE-TRIAL SCHEDULE * " 
The pre-trial scheduie for this cause shall be as follows; 
1. 12 WEEKS BEFORE TRIAL - DISCLOSURE QF WITNESSES: 
Each party shall disclose in writing to all other parties a complete list of all witnesses, 
expert and lay, which that party intends to call at trial, together with a summary of the 
testimony of each. 
2. 12 WEEKS BEFORE TKlAL -DISCLOSURE OF EXHIBITS: 
Each party shall disclose, in writing, to all other parties, and the court, a complete list 
of all exhibits, with a summary of the points to be proven, with a copy attached, 
which that party Intends to use at trial. 
3. 10 WEEKS BEFORE TRIAL DISCOVERY COMPLETION: 
All discovery shall be com!ieted. Discovery requests shall have been sewed 
sufficiently in advance of this data to require responses to such requests to be Filed 
by this date, Motions for compulsion, sanctions andlor extensions will be filed ih 
advance of this date. 
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60 DAYS BEFORE TRIAL - MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 4. - 
I. R. C, P, rule 56(b) shall controi the filina of Motions for Summarv Judament and . . - - 
briefing schedule. 
6. 6 WEEKS BEFORE TRIAL - MOTION DEADLINE: 
Except for motions for summary judgment, as set out above, and motions directly 
related to trial procedure, no motions shall be filed after thls date. In addition to other 
requirements of tile Rules, or of Orders o i  this Court, if any, all motions filed with 
this Court must be supported by a memorandum of position and authorities. Adverse 
parties shall oppose in the same manner. 
6. 6 WEEKS BEFORE TRIAL - PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE OF PARTIES: 
Counsel, and any unrepresented parfy, shall hold a pre-trial conference in an 
effort to resolve the action or to prepare a definitive pre-trial order and plan for trial. 
Each party shali be prepared to fiiliy discuss each issue and defe~ise presented by 
the case, The parties shall fully consider the requirements of I.R.C.P. rule 16, This 
conference will be held at the office of the plaintiff's counsel unless otherwise 
agreed. Plaintiff's counsel shall take the isad in organizing and presenting 
discussion. 
Exhibits shall be pre-marked (numerkally for plaintiff and alphabetically for 
defendant. An index of all exhibits shall be prepared showing numbertietter, 
offering party, brief description, and whether offered without objection, or if not, the 
legal grounds for objection. 
7, 4 WEEKS BEFORE TRIAL PRE-TRIAL REPORT AND PROPOSED ORDER: 
The parties shall file a report of their pre-trial conference, including any stipulations 
of the parties, arid a proposed order, substantially covering those matters 
contemplated by I.R.C.P. rule 16(e)(G)(A) through (K). The report shali include the 
index of pre-mark~d exhibits. Plaintiff's counsel shall take the lead in drafting the 
report and proposed order. Any party disagreeing with the content shall submlt a 
separate report identil'ying the area(s) of disagreement with explanation of 
differences. . 
8. 2 WEEKS BEFORE T~L& - BRIEFS -EXHIBIT COPIES: 
Pre-friai POINTS AND AUTHORITIES on all substantive, procedural or evidentiary 
issues anticipated shail be filed, 
Each party shall furnish the court with, a c o ~ ~  of each exhibit capable of being 
copied, in a binder, and tabbed for reference. A tabbed insert sheet, summarizing 
any exhibit not capable of being copied, shall be included, 
CVEI-ORDER FOR TRIAL, PRE'I'RIAL 
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JULIUJIZUU'II'IUb UZ:  US PM I'IiANKL'" LO. CUUBT 
I - FAX No, 206 852 79"" 
Pursuant to Rule 16, i.R.C.P, a formal Pre-trial Conference shall be held on 
December 13,2007 at 1.30 p.m. 
"* BENCH TRIAL "" 
11. 10 DAYS BEFORE BENCH TRIAL - PROPOSED FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
Unless Findings and Conclusions are waived by mut~lal stiRulation of the parties, 
proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW will be filed by each 
partv. The court will not proceed lo trial without them. Sanctions will be 
imposed for delav. 
Proposed findings shall be concise and shall recite ultimate rather than mere 
evidentiary facts. They will serve not only as suggested flndings of fact but also a 
convenient recitation of contentions of the respective parties to be before the court 
as If hears and considers the evidence. . . 
Proposed conclusions of law should be similarly concise and reflect those that can 
be drawn reasonably from the proposed findings of fact, and that would support the 
judgment or decisions sought. Citation of authority should not be included but shall 
be sublnltted separately as Points and Authorities. 
EARLIER CUT-OFF DATES MAY BE STIPULATED BY THE PARTIES, 
PROPOSED EXTENSIONS OF DATES SHALL BE SUBJECT TO APPROVAL 
BY THE COURT. 
DELAY OF TRIAL CAUSED BY THE FAILURE OF A PARTY TO COMPLY 
WITH THIS PREwTRIAL SCHEDULE WILI. RESULT IN SANCTIONS, 
INCLUDING, AMONG OTHER THINGS, CONTINUANCE, DISMISSAL, 
STRIKING, EXCLUSION OF WITNESS AND EWIDENCF, AND FINANCIAL 
PENALTIES. 
CVEI-ORDER FOR TRIAL. PRETRIAL 
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SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE ) 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, ) 
and Scott Beckstead, Individually, ) 
) CASE NO. CV-2006-390 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs . ) ORDER TO CONTINUE TRIAL 
) 
) 
CITY OF PRESTON, ) 
) 
A Hearing having been held on the 28th day of June, 20.07 on 
Defendant's Motion to Continue Trial, and Plaintiff and 
Defendant's counsel having agreed to said continuance, and 
further that said counsel have submitted a Stipulation to the 
court to continue trial setting forth the reasons for a 
continuance, and good cause appearing therefore: 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that trial in the above 
entitled matter is hereby reset for January 8, and 9, 2008, 
commencing at the hour of 9 : 3 0  A.M. at the Franklin County 
courthouse, Preston, Idaho. 
' , 2 0 0 7 .  Dated this x r d a y  of 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served by first class mail, postage 
csimile, or hand delivered on this 13 day of 
Steven R. Fuller [ 1 U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law [ Facsimile 
24 North State [ I Hand Delivered 
PO Box 191 
Preston, ID 83263 
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683 
Clyde G. Nelson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Facsimile (208) 547-2135 
[ I U.S. Mail 
[)il Facsimile 
[ I Hand Delivered 
CLYDE G. NELSON 
Attorney at Law 
172 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Telephone: (208) 547-2135 
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136 
Idaho State Bar No. 11 97 
Attorney ibr Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE, 1 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, 1 
and Scott Beckstead, Iildividually 




) REPLY MEMORANDUM TO 
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
CITY OF PRESTON, j SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, the Defendant, City of Preston, Idaho, and submits the following Reply 
Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motioll for Summary Judgment. 
1. Attached hereto and made a part of this Reply Memoranduin are the Second 
Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn, former City Engineer of Preston, Idaho, and the Supplenlentary 
Affidavit of  Clyde G. Nelson, Attorney for Defendant. 
2. Plaintiff asserts in Paragraph 2 of his Affidavit that he was initially told by Darrell 
Wilburn that the fire-flow was adequate for the proposed subdivision. Ordinance No. 39 1, attached 
to the Affidavit of Jerry Larsen, requires a 6-inch line to serve all subdivisions. (See First and 
Second Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn). It was discovered by Mr. Wilburn that the 6-inch line was 
connected to a 4-inch line which would restrct the flow. Scott Martin, Franklin County Fire District 
Fire Marshall was of the opinion that the restriction would limit fire-flow within the subdivision and 
therefore required a 6-inch line to be constructed either on Oneida Street or 800 East Street.(Second 
Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn) This decision was controlling upon the City, and therefore, the 
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Plaintiff was required to install a 6-inch line (oversized to a 12-inch line by the City). The 6-inch 
line was not installed because the City wished to irnprove the water system, as suggested by Plaintiff. 
3. The Plaintiff asserts in Paragraph 5 of 15s Affidavit that it was the City's choice to 
install a pipeline on 800 East. That is also incorrect. Plaintiffwas given the option of installillg the 
line on Oneida Street, which would have involved construction of only 1,000 feet of line, or he could 
install the line on 800 East which required approximately 1,600 to 1,700 feet. The Plaintiff chose 
the latter option because there were existing utilities on Oneida Street to illclude telephone, gas, 
water, and sewer service lines. (First and Second Affidavits of Darrell Wilbur~l). 
4. The Plaintiff asserts in Paragraph 13 of his Affidavit that prior to developing 
Creamery Hollow Subdivision, that Darrell Wilburn, City Engineer, "confirmed to ine that pursuant 
to City Ordinance, I should be reimbursed the cost of materials and labor used to constl.uct and install 
the water pipeline." That too is incorrect. As Darrell Wilburn states in his Second Affidavit, Mr. 
Beckstead did not discuss reimbursement of costs, materials, and labor prior to co~lstruction of the 
subdivision. His only contact with Mr. Beckstead in that regard was when Mr. Beckstead discussed 
reimbursement with him in October, 2004. This was after construction of the line, and Darrell 
Wilburn merely advised Mr. Beckstead to discuss the same with the City Clerk. (See First and 
Second Affidavits of Darrell Wilburn). Mr. Wilbur11 fullher states in his Second Affidavit that 
Beckstead did not advise him of any labor, materials, or costs incurred by him in the cost of 
construction at that time. As set forth in Paragraph 9 of Jerry Larsen's Affidavit, Mr. Becltstead 
never did discuss with the City at any City Council meeting, or witl~him personally, reinlbursement 
for intervening colmections to the waterline by third party property owners. 
5. Plaintiff asserts in his Memorandunl (Paragraphs 7-9) that the wording of the 
Ordinance in question (Section 16.28.030B, apart oEOrdiilanceNo. 39 1) that the subdivider pay the 
costs of the facilities to the City is "discretionary" and not "mandatory". Assulniug that this language 
is discretionary, the Plaintiffthen asserts that the obligation of the City to enter a deferred credit on 
the books for the subdivider and to charge benefitted intervening property owners is mandatory. 
Plaintiff is misreading the language of the Section in question. While it is discretionary with the 
subdivider to pay the costs to the City and to request the City to solicit competitive bids, it is 
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necessary for the subdivider to request that coinpetitive bids be solicited and that he pay the 
anticipated costs to the City prior to activating the provisions of the ordinance. The Subdivider may, 
or may not, request the city to conduct competitive bidding, and thereafter pay or not pay the cost 
to the City. I-fowever, if the subdivider does not, the provisions of the ordinance are not activated, 
and the City is under no duty to collect any suns from intervening property owners for subsequent 
connections. The subdivider has a choice. If he elects to activate the ordinance by requesting 
conlpetitive bids, and paying the cost of improvements to the City, lle risks the possibility that the 
competitive bids may be higher than the amount required for him to install the line. He would then 
be required to pay that sum to the City, and the City would construct the line. In the alternative, he 
can choose not to request competitive bids or to pay that sum to the City, and install the line himself, 
most likely at a cheaper cost. The onlv discretionary part, ofthis ordinance is whetl~er the subdivider 
elects to activate the ordinance prior to the construction of the line. Ifhe fails to do so, the ordinance 
does not apply. and the City has no duty to the Subdivider. 
6. Plaintiff argues that the ordinance does not require an agreement. Plaintiff asks, 
"What would the agreement say that the City would conlply with its own ordinance?" (Paragraph 9, 
Plaintiffs Memorandum). He then argues that tile City has a responsibility toward its citizens. The 
subdivider also has an obligation to act responsibly. Througl~out his Affidavit, ( ~ a r a ~ r a p l ~ s  2 and 
13), and in the Menlorandun, the Plaintiff asserts that he was well aware of the ordina~lce prior to 
development of the subdivision, construction of tlie waterline, or even the purchase of his property 
for the subdivision. But then, would not the subdivider have been required to act responsibly by 
notifying the city that he wanted competitive bids and that he would pay the sum required for 
construction of the line to the City. Instead, he seeks to sandbag the City and altllough having 
knowledge ofthe ordinance, waits one year after construction ofthe line before broaching the subiect 
to the Citv by his letter of October 22,2004, and after the intervening property users had already paid 
the City the reauired fees for comlections. (Paid Septenlber and October 19, 2004) (See First 
Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn, Affidavits of Jolui Balls and Jerry Larsen). At the time that the 
intervening property owners paid their fee, they paid the sum charged by the Citv for its costs of 
connecting the intervening lines to the water-main: The city made no money on the connections. 
The connection fee is consumed through labor, materials, and equipment provided by the City for 
the connections. If the Plaintiff had raised the matter to the City Council prior to his construction 
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of the line, an agreement could have been entered into, specific amounts deternlined, and a fee, 
above that cost charged by the City for its normal connections, could have been established for 
intervening connections. 
The Plaintiff questions what good an agreement would do. First, the "Agreeme~lt" is 
specifically referred to, and is a requirement of the Ordinance. The agreement would establish an 
effective date for the five years to colnnlence running, the amount to be reimbursed, and the division 
of costs to benefitted properties. It would have determined who are intervening property owners. 
How else would the City lulow the cominencement date, the amount to be collected, the property 
owners benefitted, and how much to pay Beckstead each time an intervening property .owner 
connected? Mr. Beckstead asserts that he received no benefit from the line. As set forth above, fhe 
Fire Marshall reouired the installation of the 6-inch line along the entire distance that Mr. Beclcstead 
installed the same. The Fire Marshall determined that this would tlserefore provide an adequate fire- 
flow to the interior of Beclcstead's subdivision. TIILE. the Plaintiff benefitted froin the line. Without 
the line, he would not have been allowed to construct the subdivision. As it turns out, Beckstead 
benefitted the nlost from the construction of the line. He has 22 lots within his Subdivision, and only 
5 additional intervening property owners have connected to the line. Thus, Beckstead has benefitted 
22127th~ of the cost of the improvements. 
As Beckstead has benefitted the most from these in~provements, is he to be fully 
reimbursed by the five intervening property owners? The result would be for Beckstead to obtain 
the improvements for his subdivisio~l free of charge, and the third party intervening users, or the 
City, would pay for those improveme~lts. This is hardly equitable to the intervening property owners 
or to the City. Beckstead asserts that he has to bear the entire cost of the pipeline installed for the 
benefit of others. That is not true. Beckstead benefitted the most by these i~nprovenlents and again, 
would not have been permitted to construct the subdivision without the improvements. 
7. $6-91 1, I.C., requires every claim against a govermnental entity to be prosecuted 
within two years after the date the claim arose. Said Section reads as follows: 
6-911 LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. Every clainl against a 
govermnental entity permitted under the provisions of this act or 
against an e~nployee of a gover~mental entity shall be forever barred, 
unless an action is begun within two (2) years after the date the clainl 
arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later. 
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As stated by the Plaintiff in his Affidavit, and in his Memorandum in Support of his Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiff was fully aware of §16.28.030B, Preston Municipal Code, on 
which his case is based, prior to his purchasing his property for the subdivision, and defiantly prior 
to the construction of the waterline. His claim against the City arose when he finished construction. 
Beckstead claims that he was aware that the City owed him money as a result of this construction, 
which only depended upon the connection of the intervening property owners. Thus, as he was 
aware that he allegedly had a claim against the City at that time, he had a duty to assert it, and fulther 
a duty to file his case against the City within two years after completion of the line. The line was 
completed in October 2003. Thus, the Plaintiffwould have been required to file his cause of action 
against the City by October, 2005. The first Complaint filed by the Plaintiff was on September 8, 
2006 nearly three years after the consiruction of the waterline. The Complaint was never served on 
the City, and the First Amended Complaint was served on the City on Decetnber 8, 2006. The 
Plaintiff has failed to file his action within the required time period, and his cause of action should 
be dismissed, and judgment entered in favor of the City. 
8. Beclcstead asserts that his letter of October, 2004, constituted a claim made under 
the Idaho Tort Claims Act, and Section 50-219, Idaho Code. He states that his letter of October 22, 
2004 was adequate to place the City on notice, and that the City would not have been misled as a 
result if it had considered this request as a claim submitted under the Tort Claims Act. He cites the 
case of Smith v. the City of Preston, 99 Idaho 618 as authority for his position. &&& can be 
distinguished in that the insurance carrier for Snlith had by letter advised the City that Smith had 
been in an automobile accident, the conditions under which the City was allegedly liable, and stated 
that a claim was filed against the City, and that when total damages were determined, they would 
also be submitted to the City. Plaintiffs letter of October 22,2004 is not a clailn against the City, 
but merely arequest to meet with the City to discuss aprocess of reimbursement. The Plaintifflnade 
no claim against the City, did not assert that the City was liable, and did not make demand upon the 
City to pay the Plaintiff any sum. It did not even state the City was liable. The inadequacy of the 
letter of October 22,2004, to constitute a claim under the Idaho Tort Clailns Act or Section 50-21 9, 
I.C. has been fully discussed in Defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Sulnmary 
Judgment. Suffice it to say that the sane does not constitute a claim or demand pursuant to siction 
6-902(7), does not contain the required informatidn as required by 56-907, made no ciaill1 against 
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the City itself, and if it was a claim against the City, it was not timely filed. Tile Plaintiff was fully 
aware that he had completed col1struction in October, 2003, was fully aware at the time of the 
ordinance which he alleges allows hill1 to be reimbursed, and was aware of the amount that he had 
expended at the time. Yet he waited one year after construction to send the letter of October 22, 
2004, to the City. The day a construction project is completed triggers the notice requirement.(See 
Paragraph 13 of Defendant's Memorandunl) Furthermore, cases decided by the Idaho Supreine 
Court since have "tightened" the notice requirements. At the very least, it requires a claim or 
demand against the govenunental entity to pay the claimant a deter~nined swn, or a sum yet to be 
determined, and a description of the acts or conduct which give rise to the clai~n. Plaintiff's letter 
merely requests a meeting the Council. That request for meeting was denied. As that time, as set 
forth in the Maglluson case quoted in Defendant's initial memorandum, the Plaintiff was under a 
duty to file a claim with the City. The Plaintiff failed to file that claim until July 3 1, 2006, far 
beyond the 180 day time period required. 
Not only did the letter of October 22,2004 fail to coilstitute a claim or demand upon the City, 
merely requesting a meeting wit11 the City to discuss reimbursement, it was wltirnelv submitted and 
did mislead the City to its illjury. Again, only five interveniizg connections have been made to the 
line. The fees for connection (from wliich Beckstead seeks reimbursement) were paid to the City 
prior to Beckstead's letter of October 22,2004. The fees paid were to reimburse the City for its 
costs. Again, Beckstead's failure to timely notify the City prior to these coilnectio~ls being made 
prevented the City from establishing additional fees for intervening coln~ections by which to 
reimburse Beckstead. Tf the City were required to pay said fees to Beckstead, the City would be 
injured in that it would be deprived of funds for reimbursement to it for its cost of illstallatio~l of the 
service connections. Not only would the City suffer damages as a result of Beckstead's untimely 
notice, Beckstead would receive funds for the reilnbursement of the entire line at the expense of 
either the City, or five intervening property owners. The questioll the11 arises why five interveni~lg 
property owners should pay the full cost of a line which benefitted Beckstead's 22 lots. There is no 
windfall to the City, but there would be to Beckstead ifthe court were to grant Summary Judgnlent 
in his favor. 
9. Beckstead asserts in his Affidavit,'and reiterates in the Memorandun of 
Plaintiff in support of his Motion for Sulnmary Judgement, that Beckstead first learned that 
additional water connections had been made to the waterline after receiving the Response by the City 
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to his Discovery Request. That is incorrect. Beckstead was fully aware that illore than one 
connection had beeninade to tlne waterline in October, 2004. His letter states that he was "aware that 
several water connections have been made to that line". No further water com~ections have been 
made to the waterline since Beckstead's letter of October 22, 2004. The July 3 1, 2006, Notice of 
Claim, attempted to assert that additional water connections had been made, when none had. The 
Plaintiff recognized that the initial letter by him was inadequate as a Notice of Claim, and was 
attempting to remedy the sane. Obviously, tlne Plaintiff did not learn of the additional connectio~~s 
through Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Discovery as the Response by tlne City was made on 
February 28, 2007, long after the Notice of Claim filed by Plaintiff on July 31, 2006, alleging 
additional connections. (See Supplennentary Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson). 
10. If the court were to find in favor of the Plaintiff, attorney fees and costs, slnould not 
be awarded, as tlne City has acted with a reasonable basis in fact and in law in denying any request 
by the Plaintiff. The defenses ofthe City are not frivolous, or lightly taken. The cases are numerous 
wherein a claimant was denied attorney fees and costs fiom a gover~unental entity where the 
governmental entity acted wit11 a reasonable basis supported by fact or law. See Haw v. Idaho State 
Bd. Medicine, 2006 Idaho 31862, 137 P.3d 438(2006); Becltstead Farms. Inc. v. Bd. Of Cominirs, 
141 Idaho 855(2005). However, the City is entitled to its attoriney fees and costs incurred in having 
to defend an action which was brought by the Plaintiffwithout a reasonable basis in fact or law. TIne 
Plaintiff failed to file any claim or notice with tlne City for one year after tlne cause of action arose. 
The statutes are explicit which require a claim of some type to be filed with the goverm~nental entity 
within 180 days after the claim arose. As the claim arose on the date that the Plaintiff i-inislled 
construction (October, 2003) it was incumbent that the Plaintiff file his claim by the end of April, 
2004. I-Ie failed to do so. He has brought an action against ihe.City without legal basis, afker llaving 
failed to comply wit11 the notice requirements, and after the two year statute of limitations had 
expired. He has subjected the City and its taxpayers to needless and unwarra~ted expense to defend 
this action. The City should recover its attorney fees and costs. 
DATED thiJLday of July, 2007. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that a true and correct copy of Defei~dant's Reply Memorandul~ to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was served, first class postage, on the 23'* day of July, 
2007. 
Steven R. Fuller [x] U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law 
24 North State [ ] Hand Delivered 
PO Box 191 
Preston, ID 83263 M Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 852-2683 
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CLYDE G. NELSON 
Attorney at Law 
172 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Telephone: (208) 547-2135 
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136 
Idaho State Bar No. 1197 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE, ) 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, ) CASE NO. CV-2006-390 
and Scott Beckstead, Individually 1 
) 
Plaintiff, ) SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
VS . ) DARRELL WILBURN IN 
) SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
) REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S 
CITY OF PRESTON, ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
) JUDGMENT 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW Darrell Wilbur~~, up011 oath duly deposes and says: 
1. I have reviewed the Affidavit of Scott Beckstead dated June 21,2007 filed in 
Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2. As represented in Paragraph 2 of Mr. Beckstead's Affidavit, I did llleet with him 
prior to his developlnent of the proposed subdivision. It is true that I advised him 
that he would need to co~lllect o a 6-inch waterline. The same is required by the 
Subdivision Ordinance of the City. At the time the fire flow test was conducted, I 
was unaware that the 6-inch line to which Mr. Beckstead would have connected 
was in turn coimected to a 4-inch line. The restriction in the 4-inch line would 
have created inadequate fire flow to the interior of Mr. Beckstead's subdivision. 
3.  Scott Marshall, who is Fire Marshall for Franklin County Fire District, and was at 
the time in question, advised me that even if Mr. Beckstead could obtain a fire 
flow at the beginning of the subdivision, that he was of the opitlioll tliat it would 
be an inadequate fire Row for the interior of the subdivision and that he would not 
approve the connection unless the line were 6-inch for the entire dista~lce. For 
that reason, Mr. Beclcstead was required to put in a 6-inch waterline. 
4 .  Mr. Beckstead could have put the 6-inch line along Oneida Street. This would 
have only involved replacing 1,000 feet of existing 4-inch line with a 6-inch water 
main. He had that option or to put the waterline on 800 East Street, and he chose 
the second option. He was not required to install the line on 800 East. 
5 .  If Mr. Beckstead had installed the line on Oneida Street, he may have reduced his 
expenditure as this would involve 700 feet less of pipeline. It is my recollection 
that Mr. Beckstead chose the 800 East route because Oneida Street had existing 
utilities on it to include telephone, gas, and water and sewer service lines. 
6'. I have also read Paragraph 13 of Mr. Beckstead's Affidavit. Contrary to Mr. 
Beckstead's assertions, prior to construction of the line, I did not discuss with him 
reimbursement of costs, materials, and labor for the waterline. My only contact 
with Mr. Beckstead in that regard is as stated in Paragraph 10 of my prior 
Affidavit. Mr. Beckstead discussed possible reimbursement with me after he had 
constructed the line. I did not advise him that he should be reimbursed pursuant 
to Section 16.28.030B, Preston Municipal Code, told him that he should discuss 
any reimbursement with the City Clerk, and Mr. Beckstead did not advise me of 
any labor or materials or costs incurred by him in the cost of construction at that 
time. 
7'. Contrary to Mr. Beckstead's assertion that he discovered that only one connection 
had been made to the SO0 East waterline in October, 2004, Mr. Beckstead advised 
me during our conversation in October, 2004, that he was aware of several water 
connections having been made to the Iine on 800 East as a result of development 
of the Jensen Subdivision. Four of the connections were made to the waterline in 
October, 2004, and one connection was made in November, 2004. No 
connections have been made since that time. To make a connection to the 
waterline, the same is obvious, as it is necessary for the City to excavate, place the 
connection on the city water main, and extend a pipe from the city water main to 
the property Iine of the intervening property. A water meter assembly is aiso 
attached which is usually apparent from the street. 
IATED t h i e d a y  of July, 2007. /- 
L.. 
Darrell Wilburn 
I hbscribed and sworn to before me this & day of & ,2007 
I ~,\\\\\lll~~l~llll///// ~ &' -i L. WlL(?,  +* ............. * &%.. '...?! & s ' +oTAr9&:..>o 3 I" :. 5 = .  - .  . e . - = + .  I - .  - .  -g- . - . = 
Z '..,AueLl~ ;: $ . * $=!!...- ............... 0 $ 
%4T6 
//////I,/ I,,,), , ,,,, ,(\\\\\ 2 4  
CLYDE G. NELSON 
Attorney at Law 
172 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Telephone: (208) 547-2135 
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136 
Idaho State Bar No. 1197 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE, ) 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corooration. 
and scott Beckstead, individually ) 
) CASE NO. CV-2006-390 
Plaintiff, 
) SUPPLEMENTARY AFFIDAVIT OF 
) CLYDE G. NELSON IN SUPPORT 
) OF DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO 
CITY OF PRESTON, ) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant. ) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
) 
) 
COMES NOW Clyde G. Nelson, upon oath duly deposes and says: 
1. In Paragraph 15 of the Affidavit of Scott Beckstead in Support of Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Beckstead alleges that he "learned waterline 
connections had been made along 800 East as set forth in Exhibit "H attached 
hereto" after receiving responses by the City to his discovery requests. In 
Paragraph 16 of his Affidavit, he asserts that on July 3 1,2006, a second Notice of 
Claim was presented to the City citing additional water connections that had been 
made to the water pipeliile along 800 East. 
2. Mr. Beckstead's assertioils are incorrect. He asserted in his letter of October 22, 
2004, to the City that he was aware of several connectio~ls havine been made to 
the waterline. The assertions that he became aware o f  additional waterline 
connections as a result of Responses to Discovery are also incorrect. Defendant's 
Responses to Discovery were first filed on February 28,2007. Mr. Beckstead 
could not have first learned about these com~ections througl~ the Responses to 
Discovery as he asserted the sane in his claim of July 3 1, 2006 or in his letter of 
October 22,2004. 
son, Preston City A t t y y  
Subscribed and sworn to before me t h i s 2 3  -day o 
Notary Public fbrbdaho 
. 
~ e s i d i n ~  at ~rac ;  
Co~mn. Expires 1 d .18 ' $0 1 
STEVEN R. FULLER - 2995 
Steven R. Fuller Law Office 
24 North State 
P.O. Box 191 
Preston, ID 83263 
Telephone: (208) 852-2680 
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SlXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE 
COMPANY, an ldaho Corporation, and 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CV-06-390 
MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs, Scott Beckstead Real Estate Company, an ldaho 
Corporation, and Scott Beckstead, individually, (hereafter collectively referred to as 
"Beckstead") and in response to the Defendant's, City of Preston, (hereafter "City") Motion 
for Summary Judgment, hereby submits the following memorandum: 
SUPPLEMENTAL FACTS 
1. Beckstead incorporates herein by reference the Affidavit of Scott Beckstead 
in Support of Beckstead's Motion for Summary Judgement and the Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment already on file with the Court. 
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2.  In order to avoid a delay in obtaining approval for the Creamery Hollow 
Estates Subdivision, Beckstead did not refuse or object to installing the pipeline along 81h 
East, since he was aware there was a possibility of reimbursement pursuant to a Preston 
City Ordinance relating to subdivisions. He went forward with the installation of the pipeline 
even though his subdivision water connection would be made to an existing six-inch water 
line with sufficient fire flow, which met the existing requirements of the City. It was not until 
later the City determined the six-inch water pipeline was, at some point along Oneida 
Street, reduced to a four-inch water line and would have to be replaced or Beckstead was 
given a choice to install a new pipeline along 8Ih East: (See Ex. A to Second Affidavit of 
Beckstead, a Memo authored by City Engineer Darrel Wilburn). 
3. No engineering costs were incurred on this project and none were required 
by the City of Preston. The City had its own engineer to review the project as it so desired 
and no separate design or engineering oversight was required by the City. (See Second 
Affidavit of Scott Beckstead). 
4. The City was fully aware Beckstead was purchasing the pipe for the project 
since reimbursement to Beckstead for "oversizing" the pipe to twelve inches had already 
been discussed and invoices provided by Beckstead to City representatives and the cost 
of the pipe was not objected to by the City as being excessive or extraordinary. (See 
Second Affidavit of Scott Beckstead). 
5 .  The entrance to Beckstead's subdivision is located on 6Ih East in Preston. 
The pipeline he installed is on 81h East. The pipeline is completely "off-site" from his 
subdivision. 
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6. The City did not require competitive bidding on the project nor that the costs 
of the project be paid to the City directly, but instead Beckstead was allowed to purchase 
the pipe directly from vendors and to be responsible to install the pipe himself. (See 
Second Affidavit of Scott Beckstead). 
ARGUMENT 
11. THE CITY'S INTERPRETATION OF ORDINANCE 16.28.030 B IS AN 
ATTEMPT TO OBFUSCATE THE PLAIN INTENT OF THE ORDINANCE. 
The intent of the Preston City Ordinance Section 16.28.030 B (hereafter "City 
Ordinance") is to provide for reimbursement of costs incurred for "off-site" improvements 
made by a subdivider when required by the City so that one person is not required to bear 
all the costs of installing an improvement which shall benefit intervening property owners 
who connect to sewer and water lines put in place solely at the cost of the subdivider. The 
City Ordinance was an attempt to share the burden of such costs, allowing them to be 
more fairly apportioned among those who connect to the water or sewer line after the total 
cost of the initial construction has been borne solely by one individual or entity. 
The City's initial argument (Def. Brief p.5) focuses on the first sentence of the 
ordinance which states: 
Whenever any intervening property ("off-site") is benefitted by the 
installation of any of the required facilities, the subdivider pay the 
cost of such facilities to the Citv, such costs to be determined by 
competitive bids solicited by the city togetherwith verified engineering 
costs required therefore. (emphasis added) 
The City sidesteps the obvious intent of the City Ordinance and ignores the use of the word 
"may" in the first sentence of the ordinance by making the requirements for competitive 
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bidding and engineering costs mandatory rather than discretionary as denoted by the use 
of the word "may". Further, the City did not require competitive bidding or engineering nor 
that the costs of the facilities had to be paid to the City. It is incumbent upon the City to 
make such requirements known to the subdivider, if the City wishes to make such 
requirements mandatory. No form, no letter, nothing was given to Beckstead which would 
have let him know the City was making mandatorycompetitive bidding and payment to the 
City of the costs of such facilities. The City knew full well Beckstead was paying for the 
project and would obtain his own pricing for materials as evidenced by the City's 
reimbursement to Beckstead for the costs of oversizing the pipe to 12 inches in diameter. 
The City did not object to the prices he obtained. The City did not require engineering 
drawings or detailed schematics since installation of the pipe was relatively simple and the 
City had its own engineer to oversee any aspects of the project it so desired. 
The City also states that the parties had to enter into an "agreement" before the 
subdivider could be reimbursed and that such agreement had to have been in writing. 'The 
City's argument seems to be that some type of written agreement must be entered into 
before the City is required to obey the terms of its own Ordinance. Nowhere in the City 
Ordinance does it say there must exist an agreement in writing and obviously an oral 
agreement was reached with regards to putting in the pipeline as evidenced by the 
memoranda and letters between the City and Beckstead detailing what he would be 
required to do. 
The City argues if an agreement had been put in place, then the City could have 
charged more to persons connecting to the water system or made other arrangements had 
they but known they would have to follow the terms of their own Ordinance. Certainly, the 
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City is charged with the knowledge of its own Ordinances and what it could have.charged 
or should have done is mere speculation. The City points to no ordinance which would 
have ailowed it to charge more for a water connection along 800 East than it would charge 
to another person connecting to the water system in another part of the City. 
The remaining arguments propounded by the City on pages 6 and 7 of its brief are 
both confusing and illogical. Reference is made to the lots in Beckstead's subdivision and 
some type of mathematical calculation created by the City's engineer stating that 50 
properties could have benefitted from the installation of the pipeline, then Beckstead would 
have been responsible for 22150th~ of said costs. Whatever water connection fees or 
costs were incurred or paid for the lots within Beckstead's Creamery Hollow Estates 
Subdivision are irrelevant to this case since the ordinance mandates reimbursement for 
"off-site" improvements which are required by the City to which others may later take 
advantage by connecting to the pipelines installed by the subdivider. The City's argument 
has no merit since it is not applicable to the straight forward language of the City 
Ordinance. Certainly, Beckstead was not reimbursed any monies for the connections 
made within his subdivision. The City Ordinance does not provide for some type of 
apportionment as is suggested by the City based upon who benefits from the water 
connections. It states in simple and easy to understand terms: 
The City shall thereafter enter a deferred credit in its books and records 
and shall charge the benefitted intervening property owners the fee 
rates for sewer and water connections in effect at the time such 
connections are made. Such fees shall then be returned to the 
subdivider to reimburse the costs of the installation of the facilities; ... 
Memorandum in Response to 
Defendanvs Motion for Summary Judgment - Page 5 
The mathematical formula proposed by the City based upon the number of possible water 
connections to the pipeline makes no sense in light of the clear language of the City 
Ordinance. 
Ill. THE DEMAND FOR REIMBURSEMENT BY BECKSTEAD IS A 
STATUTORY CLAIM NOT A CLAIM BASED IN CONTRACT AND 
THEREFORE THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS IS NOT APPLICABLE. 
The City claims no written agreement was entered into between the parties and 
therefore enforcement of the ordinance would be contrary to the Statute of Frauds. 
Beckstead is not suing the City for breach of contract but is asking the City to obey its own 
ordinance which mandates reimbursement to him. This is clearly the intent of the 
ordinance and no contract is required to force the parties to obey the law. 
The City claims since there was no contract in writing between the parties, the 
enforcement of such an "agreement" could not extend beyond one year. The ordinance 
itself clearly grants a five-year period for reimbursement to the subdivider for off-site 
improvements made as a requirement by the City when intervening property owners 
connect to a water or sewer connection installed by the Subdivider. No violation of the 
statute of frauds occurs when the language of the ordinance itself provides for five years 
in which to obtain reimbursement. 
IV. BECKSTEAD PROVIDED THE CITY WITH AN ADEQUATE NOTICE 0 6  
CLAIM ON OCTOBER 22,2004. 
The City claims Beckstead's letter of October 22, 2004 does not meet the 
requirements of Idaho Code 36-907. The purpose and intent of the Notice of Claim statute 
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is to provide a public entity with sufficient notice of a claim so that it would not be misled 
to its prejudice. This principle is stated in the last sentence of the statute: 
A claim filed under the provisions of this section shall not be held 
invalid or insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in stating the time, 
place, nature or cause of the claim, or otherwise, unless it is shown 
that the governmental entity was in fact misled to its injury thereby. 
Following the letter by Beckstead on October 22, 2004, in which he requests 
reimbursement for his off-site improvements pursuant to the City Ordinance (Beckstead 
Aff., Ex. F), the City replied, through counsel, with a two-page letter dated November 16, 
2004, stating in detail why it denied Beckstead's claim. (Beckstead Aff. Ex. G) The City's 
letter of denial did not state the City did not understand or was confused about what 
Beckstead was claiming. It is obvious from the City's letter, it knew exactly what Beckstead 
was referring to and the City was certainly was not misled to its prejudice by some 
inaccuracy or insufficiency in the letter. The City even knew how much the materials had 
cost Beckstead since they had exchanged that information as part of the City's 
reimbursement to Beckstead for the oversizing of the pipe. 
The City's position on when the 180 day period for filing a Notice of Claim began is 
untenable. In its brief on page 10, the City states: 
Beckstead was aware of the costs of his improvements and laborwhen 
he completed his construction in October, 2003. His cause of action, 
if any, arose at that time. 
In essence, the City asserts Beckstead should have filed a Notice of Claim before 
any other connections had been made to the pipeline he installed and before any fees had 
been paid by intervening property owners as contemplated by the City Ordinance. What 
would have been the purpose of such a claim since nothing was owed to Beckstead at that 
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time. Beckstead's claim is not for the failure of the City to pay him for the project upon its 
completion, but the failure of the City to reimburse him over a five-year period pursuant to 
the City ordinance. He was not hired as a contractor by the City to install the pipeline and 
he did not expect to be paid upon completion of the project. 
The City's argument is even more misplaced given the fact the City Ordinance 
allows the subdivider a period of five years to obtain reimbursement for the construction 
of his off-site improvements. If anything, the letter by Beckstead and subsequenttort claim 
notice filed on his behalf could be considered premature, since Beckstead should have the 
entire five years in which to collect reimbursement and time for providing a Notice would 
begin running at the end of the five-year period 
In Farberv. State ofldaho, 102 ldaho 398,401-402,630 P.2d 685,688-689 (1981) 
the Supreme Court reviewed a case in which owners of the building brought an action 
against the State and others for negligent planning, construction and design of a street 
reconstruction project and seeking damages for condemnation of a portion of their 
property. The District Court granted the State's motion to dismiss for failure to timely file 
a notice of claim under the ITCA, but the Supreme Court reversed the decision and 
remanded the case back to the District Court. At issue was whether or not the Plaintiffs 
had to file their notice of claim before the project was completed orwhether they could wait 
until the project was done before triggering the notice of claim statute. The ldaho Court 
stated: 
Unless the contract and all the acts performed pursuant to the contract 
have been completed, it would be difficult for the State to determine the 
nature or extent of its liability or prepare defense to any claim. 
Furthermore, if parties can present the State with a complete and 
definite claim for damages arising from the continuing tort, then the 
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State may attempt a settlement on the basis of clearly ascertainable 
facts. If we were to adopt a contrary view, settlements would either be 
based on pre-completion, speculative damages, orwould have to await 
the completion of the project. A strict or literal interpretation of the 
notice requirements of the ITCA would result in denying the legitimate 
claims of those who have suffered injury at the hands of the State, 
without furthering in the least the legislative purposes behind the 
statute. 
Footnote 3. We do not suggest that it would be improper to file an ITCA 
notice of claim prior to completion of the project. We simply address 
the question of the last possible day upon which a notice meeting the 
requirements of the act must be filed. 
If the word "ordinance" is substituted for the word "contract" in the above quotation, 
it becomes clear Beckstead would have five years from the day he completed the project 
to file his notice of claim. To file a claim when he completed the project would have been 
useless and speculative, at best, since it was impossible to know how many water 
connections, if any, would be made to the pipeline. If no connections were made to the 
pipeline installed by Beckstead during thefive-year period prescribed in the City Ordinance, 
he would have no claim against the City for any reimbursement. Certainly, he should be 
allowed to file a claim before the completion of the five-year period, as he learned of 
connections made to the pipeline. In fact, each connection could trigger a new notice of 
claim and a lawsuit to collect each, however, filing suit in multiple causes of action for 
essentially the same purpose is contrary to any notion ofjudicial economy and the general 
policy against multiplicity of lawsuits. One of the purposes of requesting a Writ of 
Mandamus from the Court in this case is to require the City to continue to reimburse 
Beckstead until he has been paid in full as connections are made to the pipeline he 
installed rather than making him guess as to when such connections are made and fees 
paid to the City. 
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Beckstead was not hired by the City to do the pipeline installation. If this were so, 
he would have had an immediate claim upon the completion of the pipeline installation for 
payment by the City and the notice requirement would have started to run. When 
Beckstead completed the pipeline installation in October of 2003, he had no basis for a 
claim against the City since any claim he may have had would arise over the next five 
years pursuant to the City Ordinance. The City's argument that Beckstead had to file a 
notice of claim when he completed the pipeline installation, defies reason and would have 
resulted in a claim for purely speculative damages. The only way to know the actual 
amount the City should be required to reimburse Beckstead would be to wait until the entire 
five-year period has elapsed. In the meantime, the City should reimburse Beckstead for 
those water connection fees that have been paid up to this point in time. 
The case upon which the City heavily relies in its brief is Magnuson Properties v. 
Coeur D'Alene, 138 Idaho 166, 59 P.2d 971 (2002). In fact the City asserts this case to 
be directly on point and we think it to be on point, as well. In Magnuson, the City required 
Magnuson to extend a sewer line from property owned by the City to an adjoining parcel 
owned by a third party. He objected because the extension increased his cost and 
provided no benefit to him. Magnuson claimed the City engineer agreed he would be 
reimbursed for the additional cost associated with the extension. (Obviously, there was no 
City Ordinance mandating reimbursement for such costs as there is in the case at bar). 
Magnuson sent a letter on May 10, 1996 asking for reimbursement for his additional costs 
in installing the sewer line. On August 13, 1996, the City sent a letter to Magnuson 
denying the existence of any agreement between the City and Magnuson and rejecting his 
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request for reimbursement. Magnuson then filed a Notice of Tort Claim on February 18, 
1997, beyond the 180-day notice period, 
What the City in our case fails to acknowledge is the very language in Magnuson 
which is directly on point with Beckstead's position. Beckstead's letter of October22,2004 
was a claim for reimbursement and is being submitted to the Court as a notice of his claim 
pursuant to statute. Magnuson's claim was denied and this was affirmed by the Supreme 
Court, but the Court noted an entirely different outcome could have been reached had 
Magnuson asserted his May 10, 1996 letter to be a notice of his claim under Idaho Code 
$6-906 et. seq 
The Court in Magnuson, supra, at 170 stated, 
Arguably, Magnuson's May 10, 1996 letter asking for reimbursement 
was a notice of claim for purposes of the ITCA: However, because this 
argument was raised for the first time on appeal, this Court will not 
consider it. 
In this case, Beckstead will not make the same error. His letter of October 22,2004, 
was clearly a claim for reimbursement for the installation of the costs of putting in the off- 
site improvements pursuant to the City Ordinance and even more importantly, the City 
recognized it as such as evidenced by its letter denying his claim dated November 16, 
2004. (Beckstead Aff. Exs. F and G). 
The position of the Magnuson court was made even more clear in the concurring 
opinion of Justice Walters. He wrote: 
Here, the City denied the claim on August 13,1996, some 95 days after 
May 10. The City's reason for rejecting the claim is irrelevant. At that 
point, in my opinion, Magnuson was free to file an action to collect on 
the rejected claim. Magnuson did not need to later send in a second 
claim addressing the same dispute when that claim had already been 
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denied by operation of  the terms of the pertinent statute and by the 
City's rejection in fact. 
However, Magnuson chose not to rely on the,May 10 letter as a notice 
of claim. Instead, Magnuson continued to pursue discussions with the 
City in an attempt to receive reimbursement for its project's costs. 
When Magnuson's attempts proved futile, Magnuson sent another 
demand notice in February, 1997, and then filed suit when that demand 
was rejected. As it turned out, of course, the February 1997 Notice of 
Claim was held untimely by the District Court upon the facts as 
presented and argued by the parties in this case. 
The Court's opinion in this case correctly notes that Magnuson did not 
contend in the District Court that the May 10 letter had the effect of the 
Notice of Claim under the ITCA. Indeed, even at oral argument on this 
appeal when the subject was broached, Magnuson took the position 
that the May 10 letter did not serve as a notice to the City of 
Magnuson's claim. 
Because Magnuson decided to proceed under its own interpretation of 
the steps to be followed without suggesting to the Court the correct 
alternative route, this Court is not required to reconstruct the case and 
put it on the proper track. Accordingly, I concur with the approach 
expressed in the Court's opinion concerning the role the May $0 letter 
legally played in this case. 
The poor choice by Magnuson shall not be repeated here. The Beckstead letter is 
submitted to this Court as notice of his claim and it certainly was sufficient to put the City 
on notice as intended by ldaho Code 56-907 and the City was not misled to its injury or 
prejudiced by any lack of specificity in the letter. 
As noted in Beckstead's opening brief, a very similar situation occurred in another 
appellate decision ironically involving the City of Preston. In Smith v. Cify of Preston, 99 
ldaho 61 8, 586, P.2d 1062 (1978), the City tried unsuccessfully to avoid a legitimate claim 
by stating the notice sent to the City was insufficient. In that case, a letter sent by an 
Memorandum in Response to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment - Page 12 
insurance carrier on a subrogation claim was deemed to be sufficient notice by Smith of 
his claim to the City. The Court held at 621: 
Although the contents of the letter of October 8 does not comply with 
all of the requirements enumerated in Section 6-907, we believe the 
contents of the letter were adequate in light of the final proviso of that 
section which states that '(a) Claim ... shall not be held invalid or 
insufficient by reason of inaccuracy in stating the time, place, nature or 
cause of the claim, or otherwise, unless it is shown that the 
governmental entity was in fact misled to its injury thereby'. 1.C. § 6- 
907. 
In Smith, supra, at 621, the Court indicated there was nothing in the record to 
suggest the City was "misled to its injury" by any deficiencies in the contents of the letter. 
"On the contrary, the reply by the City's insurance carrier indicates that the October 8 letter 
was sufficient to notify the City that a claim against it was being pursued and to apprise the 
City of sufficient facts for it to investigate the matter, determine its merits and prepare a 
defense". 
The City in this case would be hard pressed to state with complete honesty it did not 
know what was meant by the Beckstead letter of October 22,2004, or that it was misled 
to its prejudice by that letter. Obviously, the City understood the letter or else how would 
it have been able to prepare a detailed reply. 
The City cites a number of cases in its brief in which the Supreme Court has 
affirmed decisions in which claims have been dismissed for failure to file a timely or proper 
notice of claim, but each case must be looked at in light of its peculiar and separate set of 
circumstances and then compared to the case at hand. None of the cases cited by the 
City come closer to the current set of facts and circumstances than Magnuson, supra and 
City of Preston, supra. 
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In Fosfer v. Koofenai Medical Center, 143 ldaho 425, 146 P.3d 691 (2006), the 
Supreme Court did reject a claim filed by Foster, but the factual circumstances are not 
even close to the case at bar. The Medical Center was forwarded a copy of a letter sent 
to the ldaho State Board of Medicine as part of a pre-litigation screening and no letter was 
sent directly to the Medical Center by the claimant indicating he was filing a claim. The 
Court held: 
The act's purpose of putting the government on notice to possible 
claims to which it may be subject, requires more than reliance on 
coincidental actions by a neutral third party. We conclude that Foster 
may not take advantage of ISBM's fortuitous decision to forward his 
letter to KMC to satisfy his obligation under Section 6-906 of the Act; he 
was required to formally notify KMC and his neglecting to do so 
prevents adjudication of his tort claim. 
The Beckstead letter was sent directly to the City requesting reimbursement for the 
off-site improvements he had made. This does not fit in any may the fact pattern cited in 
Foster. His letter was not forwarded by some third party to the City and the City was not 
deceived in any way about who Beckstead was or what he wanted. 
The City cites BHA lnvesfments, lnc. v. CjtyofBoise, 141 ldaho 168, 108 P.3d 315 
(2004) in support of its argument Beckstead did not file a proper claim. In BHA 
Investments, at 174, the Supreme Court held a notice of claim filed by one entity would not 
be sufficient as a notice of claim for another and upheld the district court's decision. The 
relevance of this case to Beckstead's claim is unknown. The October 22, 2004 letter of 
Scott Beckstead (Beckstead Affidavit Ex. F) bears the letterhead of Scott Beckstead Real 
Estate Company and is signed by Scott Beckstead. No other entity was involved. The City 
would be hard pressed to assert it did not know with whom it was dealing when it received 
the letter from Beckstead requesting reimbursement for the offsite improvements 
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In the next case cited by the City in its brief, Mitchell v. Binghani MemorialHospital, 
130 ldaho420,942 P.2d 544 (1997), the court held oral statements made by the claimant's 
attorney to representatives of the hospital were insufficient to constitute a valid claim under 
I.C. § 6-907. Beckstead has no argument with that holding since his letter of October 22, 
2004 was in writing and did give notice of his claim which is defined by Idaho Code § 6- 
902(7) as "any written demand to recover money damages from a governmental entity or 
its employee which any person is legally entitled to recover under this act as compensation 
for the negligent or otherwise wrongful act or omission of a governmental entity . . ." 
Following along in the City's brief, it cites McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 
71 9,747 P.2d 741 (1987), a case in which a property owner had obtained a building permit 
which was later revoked by the City of Ammon. He filed a notice of claim with the City for 
improperly issuing the permit and for revoking the permit. Since more than 120 days had 
elapsed from the date the permit was issued and the date the notice was given, the Court 
upheld the District Court's decision to dismiss the action. The landowner had claimed 
substantial notice was given by previous court pleadings filed within the 120-day period, 
however, the Supreme Court held those pleadings referenced a negligent revocation of the 
permit, not an negligent issuance of a building permit and therefore his claim for negligent 
issuance of the permit was barred. 
Beckstead does not claim the City had only a partial notice of his claim, but had 
more than substantial notice of his claim for reimbursement under the City Ordinance. If 
the City was so uncertainas to Beckstead's claim following his letter of October 22, 2004, 
then why did they not invite him to a City Council meeting as he requested to discuss the 
claim? Instead, the City chose to respond in a detailed letter dated November 16, 2004 
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(Beckstead Aff. Exs. F and G) which demonstrates th&.city knew what Beckstead was 
seeking in its letter of denial. The City claims it did not have adequate notice of the amount 
of the claim, but providing that information would have been pointless, since the City was 
denying the entire claim as stated in its letter. 
The City next cites Thompson v. City ofldaho Falls, 126 ldaho 587, 887 P.2d 1094 
(1994) in which the Supreme Court held a claimant had not sufficiently described the 
conduct and circumstances which brought about her alleged injury. If it is the City's 
argument it did not have sufficient knowledge regarding the conduct and circumstances 
which brought about Beckstead's claim, then a reading of the City's denial letter 
(Beckstead Aff. Ex. G) dispels any such notion and refutes completely that argument. The 
City knew exactly what the circumstances and basis were for Beckstead's claim and to 
assert otherwise would be disingenuous. 
The next cased cited by the City is Wicksfrom v. North ldaho College, I I I ldaho 
450, 725 P.2d 155 (1986) in which students sued their college on the basis it 
misrepresented they would qualify as an entry level journeymen after successful 
completion of the course. On appeal, the court noted the claimant's attorney failed to put 
in his initial demand letter the names and addresses of the claimants, amount of claimed 
damages, and the nature of the injury claimed. However, a tort claim was not the thrust 
of the plaintiff's argument in that case as the Court stated, "It should be noted, however, 
that appellant's admitted at oral argument that the letter of August 21, 1984 was never 
intended to constitute notice of a tort claim. Rather, appellants contend that their cause 
of action lies in contract." (Wickstrom, supra at 452) 
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Whatever its argument may be, the City certainly knew the name and address of 
Beckstead and the nature of the injury claimed pursuant to his letter. (Beckstead Aff. , Ex. 
F) The exact amount of his damages was not stated in the letter but the City already had 
knowledge of the amount of materials and costs he had put into the project since the City 
had partially reimbursed him for the oversizing of the pipe. Also, Beckstead did not know 
how many water connection fees had been made and so the exact amount of 
reimbursement available could only have been known by the City. 
The City states it was somehow misled to its prejudice by the Beckstead letter since 
the City claims it was not aware Beckstead would seek reimbursement for his costs prior 
to receipt of the letter in October 2004. Does this mean the City did not know it had the 
Ordinance 16.28.030 B on its books? The City argues it could have charged more to 
intervening property owners who connected into the system had they known of Becksteads 
claim, however, the City points to no ordinance which would allow it to charge more for a 
water connection under such circumstances. If this speculative argument is to be taken 
seriously, then the City would need a special ordinance granting it the authority to charge 
for one water connection differently from another solely on the basis the City had not 
installed the pipeline in the first place. The City Ordinance itself states: 
... The City shall thereafter enter adeferred credit in its books and 
records and shall charge the benefitted intervening property owners the 
fee rates for sewer and water connections in effect at the time such 
connections are made. 
Clearly, the City could only charge those fees which were in existence at the time and no 
special fees or rates could be imposed. 
F,len.3.ana.m n Respmse lo 
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The City argues it makes little or no money from the installation of its water 
connections based upon the fees it charges. (See Affidavits of John Balls, current Preston 
City Director of Public Works and former City Engineer, Darrel Wilburn) The basis for this 
assertion is the cost of materials, labor, use of equipment, supervision and costs of 
administration, which are broken down in these Affidavits. All of these expenses, except 
the cost of materials, would be incurred anyway whether the City workers were installing 
a water connection or not, since their labor and equipment would be involved in doing 
something else for the City as part of their regular duties. Of course, the amount of such 
fee is entirely within the province of the City and the fee is set based on the City's own 
standards. If the City had to install the 12-inch pipeline required of Beckstead, how much 
more money would the City have lost from its water system budget. The City's argument 
is really immaterial since the ordinance provides that the water connection fees paid 
be reimbursed and the subdivider be paid the costs of the installation of the facilities 
over a period of five years depending on how many connections are made to the water line 
installed. There is no mention made of a net reimbursement by the City or anything similar 
to the argument now being made by the City. It simply cannot be found in the ordinance 
and is therefore not applicable. 
V. THE CITY'S ARGUMENT IT HAS NOT BEEN UNJUSTLY ENRICHED BY THE 
INSTALLATION OF THE PIPELINE BY BECKSTEAD IS CONFUSING AND 
WITHOUT MERIT. 
It appears the argument of the City against a claim of unjust enrichment by 
Beckstead is that Beckstead made a profit from the sale of lots in his subdivision and 
therefore is not entitled to reimbursement for an offsite improvement made on 8th East in 
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Preston (the entrance to Beckstead's subdivision is located on 6'h East in Preston). Had 
he lost money on the project, would the City then feel obligated to reimburse him for the 
pipeline he installed? This argument defies reason since the plain fact is Beckstead was 
required to install a pipeline on 8th East (an off-site improvement) even though his 
subdivision would connect io an existing 6-inch line at the entrance to his subdivision, with 
adequate existing fire flow. (The City's position is that the 6-inch line at some point turned 
into a 4-inch line and therefore the ordinance requiring subdivisions to connect into a 6-inch 
line was not met). Despite whatever objection he may have had to such a requirement, 
Beckstead nevertheless went forward to put in the 12-inch pipeline along 8th East in order 
to satisfy the City, but knowing there existed an ordinance which would allow him to be 
reimbursed for his costs. The City directly benefitted from the installation of the twelve-inch 
pipeline along 8lh East without having to pay for it, since it did not have to install the 
pipeline itself in order to "loop" the City's water system. (See Willburn Memo, 2nd 
Beckstead Aff. Ex. "A") Such a windfall should not be allowed to happen simply because 
the City does notwish to repay Beckstead since he made a profit on his subdivision. There 
is no rational connection between Beckstead making a profit on his subdivision and the fact 
the City obtained a windfall of 1,700 feet of pipe installed and paid for by Beckstead 
Vi. CITY ORDINANCE 16.28.030 B WAS NOT REPEALED AT THE TIME 
BECKSTEAD INSTALLED THE PIPELINE. . 
The City has to admit City Ordinance Section 16.28.03C B was not repealed at the 
time Beckstead constructed the pipeline. It was later repealed, but now, the City argues 
the language in Ordinance 461 (which clearly states it shall not apply to subdividers) 
somehow repealed the City ordinance in question herein. The language relied upon is the 
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general language found in many ordinances which states: "All ordinances or parts of 
ordinances in conflict with this ordinance are hereby repealed, ..." The attemptto bootstrap 
the repeal of one ordinance, without specifically mentioning it, through the passage of 
another ordinance which pertains to an entirely different set of circumstances is ineffective 
to repeal Ordinance § 16.28.030 B, a subdivision ordinance unrelated to ordinance 461 
and found in a different part of the City's Municipal Code. 
Ordinance 461 (Exhibit "J1" to the Affidavit of Jerry Larsen) provides for 
reimbursement to a person who extends a water or sewer line to property not currently 
being serviced by the City. The Beckstead subdivision was certainly within the City and 
he was not asked to extend a water line to an area not currently being serviced by the City. 
The 6-inch water line to which he connected ran directly in front of the property he 
subdivided. Therefore, the Ordinance upon which he reliesfor reimbursement has nothing 
to do with Ordinance 461. The type of "general or blanket repeal" urged by the City in this 
case of any ordinances in conflict therewith does not apply. If it was repealed by 
Ordinance 461, then why did the City need to later repeal Ordinance 16.28.030 B on 
December 13, 2004 (Exhibit " K ,  Affidavit of Jerry Larsen) if it had already been repealed 
by Ordinance No. 461? The answer is obvious. The City knew the Ordinance had not 
been repealed and was still in effect. 
There exists specific proceduresforthe repeal of an ordinance, none of which were 
followed in the alleged repeal of Ordinance 16.28.030 B. Idaho Code §50-902 gives the 
proper procedure: 
(...) and no ordinance or section thereof shall be revised or amended 
unless all ordinances, which are intended to amend existing 
ordinances, shall have the words which are added to such ordinance 
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underlined; when the amendment is to strikeout or repeal any part of 
an existing ordinance, the letter, figure, word or words stricken or 
repealed shall be printed with a line through such letter, figure, word or 
words in the printed bill to indicate the part stricken or repealed. 
No such procedure was followed and the City's attempt to create a blanket repeal 
of any ordinance that may generally conflict with another without even mentioning the 
ordinance or its repeal is not effective for that purpose. 
A later ordinance cannot be deemed to repeal an earlier ordinance unless there is 
an irreconcilable conflict between the two, or the new ordinance is clearly intended as a 
substitute for the prior ordinance. (56 Am Jur 2" d372 2.4 114). Our Supreme Court has 
held, "An ordinance can be repealed only by pursuance of the same method necessary for 
its enactment." Beem v. Davis, 31 Idaho 730, 175 P.959, 962 (1918). 
SUMMARY 
The first inquiry of any court into the interpretation of an ordinance or statute is to 
seek out its "intent". There can be no question the intent of the City Ordinance was to 
provide for reimbursement of costs incurred for "off-site" improvements made by a 
subdivider so that one person would not be required to bear all the costs of installing such 
an improvement. The facts of this case fit perfectly within the intent of the City Ordinance. 
The City Ordinance itself does not mandate engineering, competitive bidding or payment 
to the City for the costs of the installation of the facilities since the ordinance itself makes 
those requirements discretionary through the use of the word "may" and because thecity 
never requested such steps be taken. 
The focus of the City's brief is it did not receive adequate notice of a claim by 
Beckstead. A cursory reading of the October 22, 2004 letter by Beckstead was not only 
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sufficient to put the City on notice of his claim for reimbursement, but was more than 
adequate to provide the City enough information to prepare a detailed response denying 
the claim. 
Beckstead has, according to the City Ordinance, five years in which to seek 
reimbursement from the City for water connections made to the pipeline he installed. 
Beckstead could either file claims for the water connections as he learns of them or he 
could wait until five years have elapsed and then file a claim for reimbursement after all of 
the water connections during the five-year period had been determined. To require 
Beckstead to file a claim upon completion of the pipeline project, as the City proposes, 
would have been unreasonable and purposeless. There was nothing to claim at the time 
he completed the project since no water connections had yet been made to the pipeline. 
The City's position it repealed Ordinance 16.28.030 B through the back door by 
enacting Ordinance 461 has no merit. The City did not follow the procedures mandated 
by the Idaho Code. Further, Ordinance 461 applies to a different set of circumstances and 
does not apply to subdividers, and such a "blanket repeal" without specifically mentioning 
the ordinance being repealed would not be effective to invalidate another city ordinance. 
The City has received 1,700 feet of pipe looping its water system for which it directly 
benefitted and for which it paid nothing. Such circumstances are certainly a windfall to the 
City for which it has been unjustly enriched. 
All that Beckstead has wanted throughout this entire dispute has been for the City 
to obey its own ordinance. Even though the City has made an offer of judgment in this 
matter for $5,000.00, such amount does not adequately reimburse Beckstead for even the 
costs of the pipe he installed as required by the City. Beckstead should be entitled to the 
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full reimbursement for all of the labor, materials and costs incurred with regards to the 
installation of the pipeline, together with attorneys fees and costs as set forth in Idaho 
Code § 12-1 17 which provides a remedy for persons who have "borne unfair and 
unjustified financial burdens attempting to correct mistakes agencies should never have 
made." Bogner v. State Department of Revenue and Taxation, 107 Idaho, 854,859,693 
P.2d 1056 (1061) (1984). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of July, 2007 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served on 
the 23rd day of July, 2007. 
On: 
CLYDE G. NELSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BQX 797 
SODA SPRINGS, ID 83276 
By: 
d MAIL, POSTAGE PRE-PAID 
- HAND DELIVERY 
d TELEPHONE FACSIMILE 
(208) 547-2 I 36 
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STEVEN R. FULLER - 2995 
Steven R. Fuller Law Office 
24 North State 
P.O. Box 191 
Preston, ID 83263 
Telephone: (208) 852-2680 
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, and 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually, 
CASE NO. CV-06-390 




I Defendant. 1 
1 
BECKSTEAD'S SECOND AFFIDAVIT 
IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
ss 
County of Franklin 1 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows: 
1 .  I am one of the principals of Scott Beckstead Real Estate Company, an 
Idaho Corporation, and have personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the 
I 
above-entitled action. The statements and representations made in this affidavit are 
I made on my own behalf and as an agent and principal of Scott Beckstead Real Estate 
Company. 
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2. 1 am the developer of the Creamery Hollow Estates Subdivision, located 
on 6th East and Oneida Streets in Preston, Idaho. 
3. The water connection for Creamery Hollow Estates Subdivision made at 
the time I developed the subdivision was to the Preston City water mainline, a six-inch 
pipeline running along Oneida Street. 
4. 1 was informed by the City I could connect to the six-inch water line on 6'h 
East and Oneida Street and that sufficient fire flow existed for such connection, 
nevertheless, the City later imposed an additional requirement that I install a pipeline in 
one of two locations. I could either replace a four-inch pipe which fed into the six-inch 
pipe along Oneida Street, or install a new twelve-inch pipe along 8'h East. (See 
Engineer, Darrel Willburn, Memo dated Dec. 31, 2002, attached hereto as Exhibit "A ) .  
Either option would have resulted in the construction of an "off-site" improvement, not 
connected to my subdivision. Although I believed I was already in compliance with the 
City Ordinance since my subdivision would connect to an existing six-inch pipeline, I 
agreed to go forward with installing a twelve-inch pipeline along 8'h East, knowing that a 
City Ordinance existed which would allow a subdivider to be reimbursed for his costs as 
others made connections to the pipeline I was to install. 
5. At no time did the City of Preston require engineering costs'from me and 
no engineering costs were ever incurred as part of this project. At no time did the City 
require competitive bids for doing the pipeline installation, nor did they ever object to the 
costs of the pipe which I submitted to them from which they determined the amount to 
pay me for "oversizing" the pipe. The City did not indicate to me the costs I submitted 
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were either excessive or extraordinary. At no time did the City require me to pay the 
City for the costs of the installation of the pipeline, but instead, I paid for the costs of the 
pipeline directly to the vendors and service providers who provided materials or 
assisted in the project. At no time did the City of Preston ask me to enter into or 
provide me with an "agreement" or other form or contract which they wished me to 
review or sign relating to the pipeline project. I was never provided with a form, contract 
nor any agreement in writing which the City required to be signed in order to be 
reimbursed. 
6. Following the receipt of the City's letter denying my request for 
reimbursement, I did speak to Preston City Mayor, Neil Larser~, on at least one 
occasion, asking if the City was going to reconsider its position, and further requesting 
an opportunity to come before the City Council to discllss the matter. The Mayor 
responded he would speak to the City's legal council about the matter and later I was 
told their letter of denial would stand and there was no need for a meeting. 
7. All of the water connections made as part of the Creamery Hollow Estates 
Subdivision to the Preston City Water System are fully paid for and none have ever 
been reimbursed to me. I have obtained no direct or indirect benefit from the 
installation of a twelve-inch City water mainline along 8Ih East in Preston, Idaho. 
8.  At the time I installed the twelve-inch water mainline for the City of 
Preston, I submitted to the City the costs for the purchase of the pipe for the entire 
project and the City of Preston was made aware of how much the pipe cost. 
9. 1 incorporate herein by reference my Affidavit in Support of my Motion for 
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Summary Judgment and the exhibits attached thereto as part of my response to the 
City of Preston's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED thisdday of July, 2007. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a Notary Public for the State of 
Idaho, this &may of July, 2007. 
NOTARY PUBLIC for the State of i d 3 0  
Residing at: Preston, Idaho 
Comm. Exp: 1/21/11 
Beckstead's Second Affidavit in Response to 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment - Page 4 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Beckstead Affidavi 
in Response to Defendant's motion for Summary Judgment was served on the & 
day of July, 2007. 
2 
On: By: 
CLYDE G. NELSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 797 
SODA SPRINGS, ID 83276 
<AIL. POSTAGE PRE-PAID 
- HAND DELIVERY 
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~ o :  Scott Beckstead 
C a  Alex Hudson, P.E. 
From Danell Wllbum 
Data: December 31,2002 
RS Creamery ~o l low Subdivisions - Preliminary Plat 
Attached is the city Attorneys review and recommendations for the "Park Area". My 
recommendation is his second recornmendation. That is, deed the area to the city for use as 
a park, utility easement, and drainage area, then the city can lease it to someone until it is to 
be a park. 
Modifications lo the preliminary plat map as submitted: 
1. The end of the cul-de-sac's there is to be a 2"-clean-out and the fire hydrants are to be 
at the iniersection. (Same as Oakwood phase 3) 
2. Need a flush tap at the end ofthe water main on 6m East, 
3. Show easement for? East. 
4. Bearing for 1' South does not match bearing as shown on master street location map. 
5. The 2 ac lot with the existing barn is palt of this subdivision. 
6. Notes: 3. Total lots are 30 not. 
7. P&Z has said no more half street improvements! The south end of 6* would need to 
be shifted to the east. 
8. Place animal restridions on the this plat and the final plat 
Proposed utility improvements are addressed after the preliminary plat is accepted. The city 
has previously required subdivisions to be feed by at least a 6 inch main from a larger main 
(Majestic View). There is a 4 inch pipe which feeds the 6 inch pipe you are proposing to 
connect to for this subdivision. The city would propose that either you upgrade the two 
blocks of 4 inch pipe with the city paying for any over-sizing, or participate in a new pipe on 
8' East that would then conned y a loop to the 6 inch pipe, or connect the end of your new 
6 inch pipe to the water main on 4 south to f o n  a loop. 
CLYDE O. NELSON 
attcrney at Law 
172 South Main Street 
P.Q. BOX 797 
soda Springs, ID 83276 
Telephone: (2081 547-2135 
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136 
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COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, ) 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)39 
County of Franklin ) 
C.OtvlES NOW .leny C. Larscn being first duly swum, deposes and says: 
1. I am the City Clerk for the City c f  Preston. Idaho. 
2.  J have submitled e prior Amdavit in this case, and I adopt all ofihose statemcn:s 
as sct fmh therein. 
3. As City Clerk for the City of Preston, Idaho, I receive dl documents anillor 
requose for payment on behalf of the City. 
4. In Psragraphs 5 and 8 of Scott Becksxead's Second Afifidavit in Respansc to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment hc asserts the City did not objecr 10 
the costs of the pipe tlrat he pvrcbsscd a ~ d  the $me ewere allegedly submincd to 
the City. He npmsnts that he submitted to the City his co8i for thc purchasc of 
the p i p  and the costs ofthe project at the time he installed the pipc or upon 
completion of construction. 
5 .  Ths assertions by Mr. Beckstcad an: incorrcot. Never, did the City receive any 
statmcnt, cldm, or invoice from Mr. B~ckstead for his costs fm purchase of the 
pipe or for any labor costs for thc pqiect until MT: Becksicad had filed. suit 
agaiwt the City. The City and its representatives were not aware of Mr. 
b k s t 4 ' s  sl)sgationa of how much was owcd to him for the purciasc of the pipe 
and installation of the same untll it was served with +.he Frsr An~eded  Complaint 
in December 2006 or January 2007. 
6. Mr BEoMeed never objected to the payment made by the City to him on 
nc~ambcr 17,2004, for oversizing, nor did ho claim that he was owcd more for 
additional costs to htm for purchase of the pipe or for labor on the project. 
DATED this 2Sm of July, 2007. 
Subscribed a d  sworn to before me t h i s w a y  of X U ~ .  2007 
. Notary Publidfor Idaho 
Residing at 
Comrn. ~ x p i r e s - m w ~ : . ,  
CLYDE G. NELSON 
Attorney at Law 
172 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Telephone: (208) 547-2135 
Facsimile: ( 2 0 8 )  547-2136 
Idaho State Bar No. 1197 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE STXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REaL ESTATE, ) 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, ) CASE NO. CV-2006 -390  




CITY OF PRESTON, 
Defendant. 
) THXRD AFFIDAVIT OF 
) DARRELL W X L E W  IN 
) RESPONSE TO PLAfNTIFF'S 
) REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S 




STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 9s 
County of Custer 1 
COMES NOW Darrell Wilburn, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. I have reviewed Scott Beckstead's Second Affidavit in 
Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2. In Paragraph 5 of Mr. Beckstead's Second AEfidavit, he 
states that the City never objected to the cost of the pipe 
when he allegedly submitted the costs to the City in order 
to determine the amount to pay him for ttoversizing" the 
pipe. That assertion is incorrect. Mr. Beckstead never 
provided the City, or its representatives, 
with his costs of the pipe after completion of the line 
until he filed the law suit against the City. Mr. Beckstead 
was reimbursed for his costs of the pipeline based on 
calculations made by me based upon what the City's cost 
wouLd be for that pipeline. (See Exhibit A to my First 
Affidavit) Tt should be noted from my calculations that thc 
C i t y  reimbursed him at the rate of $10.50 per root for 12- 
inch line. Mr. Beckstead claims costs as evidenced by 
Exhibits B and C to his First Affidavit of $10.91 and $12.23 
per foot. Obviously, I did not have Mr. Beckstead's 
invoices when I prepared the calculations, nor did Mr. 
Beckstead advise me of those costs. 
3. In Paragraph 8 of Mr. Beckstead's Second 
~ffidavit, he states he "...submitted to the City the cost 
for the purchase of the pipe for the entire project and the 
City of Preston was made aware of how much the pipe cost." 
That is untrue. Mr. Beckstead does not state to whom he 
allegedly submitted these costs. As I was the City 
Engineer, they would have been submitted to me, and 1 never 
received the same from Mr. Beckstead or any other party. 
The City of Preston was unaware of what Mr. Beckstead 
claimed to be his costs until he filed suit against the 
City. In fact, when Mr. Beckstead first filed suit in late 
2006, he claimed that he was owed the sum of $10,603.60. He 
now claims in his Second Amended complaint that he is owed 
$13,153.64. Never did Mr. Beckstead present the City with 
his claimed costs prior to constructing the pipe, at the 
time of constructing the pipe, or following the construction 
of the pipe until he filed suit in late 2006. 
4. Upon receipt of payment from the City for the 
oversizing of the pipe, Mr. Beckstead did not object to the 
same or represent to the City that he was owed additional 
costs for the pipe or labor. 
DATED this 25?"ay of July, 2007. 
Subscribed and sworn t o  before me this& day of 
Residing a t  
Corn. Expires 
STEVEN R. FULLER - 2995 
Steven R. Fuller Law Office 
24 North State 
P.O. Box 191 
Preston, ID 83263 
Telephone: (208) 852-2680 
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, and 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CV-06-390 
BECKSTEAD'S THIRD AFFIDAVIT IN 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss 
County of Franklin ) 
Comes now, Scott Beckstead, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I have had an opportunity to review the Reply Memorandum to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgement and the second and third affidavits of Jerry Larsen and 
Darrel Willburn. 
2. It is apparently the Defendant's position that the Defendant did not have 
Beckstead's Third Affidavit in Response to 
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any notice for the costs for which I am seeking reimbursement from the Defendant. In 
the Affidavit of Darrel Willburn, he states, "In paragraph 8 of Mr. Beckstead's second 
affidavit, he states he I . . .  submitted to the City the cost for the purchase of the pipe for 
the entire project and the City of Preston was made aware of how much the pipe cost.' 
This is untrue". 
3. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference is a document 
dated November 12, 2003, executed by Scott Beckstead, and Darrel Wiilburn and Scott 
Martin on behalf of the Defendant. This document indicates the amount of estimated 
cost for the 12-inch pipe, the difference paid for oversizing the pipe, and the estimated 
balance remaining for the cost of six-inch pipe. This document is submitted as 
evidence the Defendant had knowledge at the time the pipeline was installed of the 
costs incurred by myself in purchasing the pipe for the project. 
&-- DATED this& day of July, 2007. 
AND SWORN to before me, a Notary Public for the State of 




NOTARY PUBLIC for the State of ldaho 
I Residing at: Preston, ldaho 
I Comm. Exp: 1/21/11 
Becksteass Third Affidavit in Response to 
Defendant's Reply to Piainliffs Motion For Summary Judgment - Page 2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Beckstead's Third 
Affidavit in Response to Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was served on the =%ay of July, 2007. 
0 n': By: 
CLYDE G. NELSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 797 
SODA SPRINGS, ID 83276 




Beckstead's Third Affidavit in Response to 
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Item Description 
1 Subdividers Pipe 
2 City Supplied Pipe 
3 Valves 
4 Saddle &Tap 
Differences 
Creamty Hollow Subdivision - 8th East Water Line 
Quanity 6" Unit" 12" Unit 6" Cost 12" Cost Difference 
1240 $3.27 $10.50 $4,054.80 $13,020.00 $8,965.20 
460 $3.27 $0.00 $1,504.20 $0.00 ($1,504.20) 
0 $356.66 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
0 $433.85 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 
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M THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
..- ". 
STATE OF IDMO, IN AND FOR TBE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
) 
SCOTT BECICSTEAD REAL ESTATE ) CaseNo. CV-2006-390 
COMPANY, hn Idaho Corporation, 1 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
Plainti$ ) ' ORDER GRANTXNG DEFENDANT'S 
) MOTION FOR SllMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. ) ANJit DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
1 FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal Corporation,) 
1 
Defendant, 1 
I. The Matter Before the Court 
This onse involves a dispute arising after Scott Beokstead (Beckstead) installed a 
watel pipeline on 8" East Street in the City of Preston in October 2003. The installation 
was done as a prerequisite to development of an unconnected area by Beokstead. 
Beckstead now seeks reimbursement for the costs associated with the installation from the 
City of Preston (City) under City ordinance 16.28.030. City denies owing the costs ofthe 
project, claiming that because Beckstead did not follow the pprocedures outlined in the 
City ordinance by not giving timely and adequate notice and failing to enter into a written 
oonlract with the City. City also claims that Beckstead failed to give notice under the Tort 
Claims Act pursuant to LC. 5 6-906. 
\ 
Scott Beckstead v City of Preston, Memorandum Declslon and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motson for 
a-.-----. r,.a--."+ omd C~antino Defendant's Motlon for Summary Judgment. - - I - - '  
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n, Standard of Review, 
A party is entitled to summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions and 
admissions, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving pasty is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 
I.R.C,P. 56(c); Foster v, TPaul, 141 Idaho 890 (2005); U.S. Bank Nut ' l  Ass '19 v. Kuenzli, 
134 Idaho 122 (2000), The burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact rests at all times upon the moving party. Jordan v, Beekr;, 135 Idaho 586 
(2001); Thompson v. City of Idaho Falls, 126 Id 587 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The standards applicable to summary judgment require the COW to liberally 
construe the facts in the record in favor of the nonmoving party and to draw all reasonable 
inferences from the facts in favor of the nonmovingparty. Northwest Bec-Corp v. Home 
Living Sew., 136 Idaho 835 (2002). If the record contains conflicting inferences or 
reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be denied. 
Id In addition, a court may properly award summary judgment to any party, not just the 
moving party, if the circumstances warrant such, Brummeft v. Ediger, 106 Idaho 724 
(1984). The fact that both parties have moved for summary judgment does not in and of 
itself establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact. However, where, as in the 
present case, both parties have moved for s m . a r y  judgment based upon the heme 
evidentiary facts and the same issues and theories, they have effectively stipulated that 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and therefore summary judgment is 
appropriate. Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co.. 100 Idaho 505,507 (1979). Kromrei V. AID Ins 
Co., 110 Idaho 549,551 (1986). Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637 (1999). Dunham v. 
Hackney Airpark Inc., 133 Idaho 613 (1999).The Court must evaluate each party's motion 
for summary judgment on its own merits. Stafford v. IClosterman, 134 Idaho 205,207 
(2000). 
a% 
Scott Beckstead v City of Preston, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Granting Defendant's Motlan for Summary Judgment. - - 2 - .  
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In this case the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material faot in 
dispute, Both parties acknowledge that the pipeline was laid and that a City ordinance 
allowed for reimbursement of the costs associated with such 'bff site" work, The disputes 
in this case revolve around the City's ordinance and whether it was applicable to 
Beckstead's situation. The questions regarding the ordinance ate questions of law. The 
other issue is whether Beckstead filed aproper and timely claim with the City. 
The ordinance gives a subdivider the right to reimbursement for the expenses they 
incur for benefiting off site properties. There is a process by which the subdivider 
acquires this right. First, the subdidvider may pay the City the costs for installation of any 
required facilities. Second, the cost paid to the City is to be determined by competitive 
bids solicited by the City along with engineering costs. Tfiird, the costs are verified. 
Lastly, the ordinance also requires an agreement between the City and the Devefoper. 
Here the City required installation of the pipeline before Beckstead could proceed 
on the Creamery Hollow Subdivision, thus it was a required facility. Instead of paying the 
City the costs, Beckstead perfoTrned the installation work himself. Because Beckstead did 
the work himself there were no competitive bids solicited. The language of the ordinance 
is ambiguous in utilizing the permissive word "may". One interpretation states that the 
word "may" only modiCres the language in close proximity. Here, the ordinance has a 
comma before and after the line "the subdivider may pay the cost of such facilities to the 
city", Preston, Idaho, City ovdinance 16.28.030 (B),(1974)(repealed December, 2004). 
This could mean that the word "may" only applies to the Subdivider's option of paying 
the costs, and does hot pertain to the other requirements of the ordinance. The ambiguity 
must be construed against the drafter, however that has little meaning in this case as the 
options are either to pay the costs and invoke the ordinance, or not to pay the costs and 
forego the reimbursement provided under the ordinance. Beckstead opted to do the work 
himself and thus the City was never put on notice as to their option of soliciting 
4% ScofI Beckstead v City of Preston, Memorandum Decis~on and Order Denyins PlaintifPs Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. . - 3 - -  
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competitive bids. The City undoubtedly knew of the ordinance because they created it. 
Nevertheless, the City has the right to know when a person is invoking the ordinance. By 
opting to not pay the City the oosts and do the work himselc Mr. Beckstead faiied to 
initiate the ordinance and thereby put the City on notice. 
The second step of the ordinance provides amethod by which the costs are to be 
determined. There is no evidence that Mr. Beckstead ever formed an agreement with the 
City prior, or during this project, by which the City could detexmine the cost of the 
project. According to Affidavit in Support ufPlainti@s Motion fur Sumnzary Judgment 
Beckstead indicates that he was aware of the ordinance prior to the development of 
Creamery Hollow Subdivision. Mr. ~eckstead knew of the ordinance and could have 
opted to pay the costs and bid on the project himsev. The ordinance i s  designed to benefit 
those who pay for the costs which are solicited by the City. There is no evidence that the 
City ever had the opportunity to solicit competitive bids because Mr. Beckstead did not 
follow the procedure of the ordinance. He cannot claim reimbursement ex post facto, 
Beckstead did verify the costs as indicated in Eechtead's ThirdAffidavit in 
Response bo Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Motionfor Summary Judgment. This 
verification is dated November 2003 and the pipe was laid in October 2003, after the 
work had been done. The language of the ordinance allows for the steps to be taken 
"whenever any intervening property is benefited", thus the subsequent verification i s  
valid, Pveston, Idaho, City ordinance 16.28.030 (B),(1974)(repealed December, 2004). 
Another issue arises as to whether Beckstead's claim is barred as untimely. This 
case is similar to that of Magnuson v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 138 Idaho 166 (2002). In 
that case the City prevailed under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (XTCA) LC. 50-219 and 
6-906, which state that claims against Municipalities must be filed within 180 days from 
when the claim arises. The notice must also be sufficient so as to put the governmental 
entity on notice that it is being prosecuted. Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 127 Idaho 
565 (1995). Compliance with the ITCA notice requirement is a mandatory condition 
precedent to bringing suit, the failure of which is fatal to a claim, no matter how 
a71 
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legitimate. McQuiZlenv. City ofAnzmon, 113 Idaho 719 (1987). The notice provision of 
ITCA also applies to actions against a city for breach of contract, as well as any other 
damages claim, tort or otherwise. Enterprise, Inc. v. Nanzpa Ciry, 96 Idaho 734 (1975) 
heitzer  v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568 (1990).This oase falls under the notice requirement of 
the ITCA as Mr. Beckstead is seeking damages against the City. 
In his Afldavit in Support of P l a i n t r s  Motion for Summary Judgment Beckstead 
indicates that he was aware of the ordinance prior to the development of Creamery 
Hollow Subdivision. He also indicates that further research revealed that the ordinance 
provided for a five year period for reimbursement of costs. The October 22,2004 letter 
from Beokstead to City may suffice as a claim putting the City on notice. The City 
Attorney subsequently wrote a letter denying Beckstead's request for reimbursement. This 
indicates that the City understood the letter to be a claim. However, this notice comes 
after the 180 day time limit placed on filing claims against a Municipality. I.C. $6-906 
A Municipal Corporation may not enact ordinances which conflict with State law. 
I.C. $50-301. Therefore, I.C, § 6-609 will control as between the 5 year period granted by 
the City ordinance and the 180 day deadline and Beckstead is subject to the 180 day 
deadline. This is the oase even if Beckstead complied with the City ordinance. 
In this case, the Plaintiff's notice came when Beckstead wrote a letter to City on 
October 22,2004. This was a year after the pipeline construction had been completed. 
The argument that Beckstead could not make a claim until he learned of connections to 
fhe pipeline is inconsequential to the issue because the City's ordinance only mandates 
reimbursement for costs to the subdivider. Preston, Idaho, City ordinance 16.28.030 
@),(1974)(repealed December, 2004). 
Beckstead lcnew the costs of the project onNovember 12,2003, as evidenced by 
Beckstead's TkirdAfldavit in Response to Defendrant's Reply to Plaintz@s Motion for 
Summary Judgment 7 3 where Beckstead states, "Defendant had knowledge at the time 
the pipeline was installed of the costs incurred by myself in purchasing the pipe for fhe 
project." This necessitates Beclcstead's knowledge of the costs as well. If the City is 
27% 
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expected to be able to discern the costs ofthe project from this Mr. Beckstead should be 
held to at least that same standard, The attached invoice for the pipe cost is signed by the 
City Engineer on November 12,2003, after the labor had been performed. Beckstead 
failed to make his claim at the same time he submitted the invoice despite having 
lsnowledge of the cost and the project being finished. Mr. Beckstead did not meet the 180 
day deadline because the letter was not sent until October 22,2004, almost a year later. 
The attachment in Beckstead's Third ASfidavit in Response to Defendant's RepZy to 
PlaintifS Mofionfor Summary Judgment dated November 12,2003, marked the 
beginning of the 'lolling because Beckstead was l l l y  apprised at that r ime of the injury 
and damages as well as the government's role. Doe V. Durtschi, 1 I0 Idaho 466 (1986). 
Plaintiffs claim is barred under LC, $ 6-906 and the 180 day time limit for claims against 
Municipalities. 
IV. Conclusion 
IT xs mnEEJi ORDEW, ~ J U D G E D ,  AND DECREED that for the 
forgoing reasons, the Mot ion f i  Sumrna~y Judgine~lt of the Plaintiffs is DENIED. 
IT IS IWRTmA ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
9 DATED this /6 day of August, 2007. 
& 2.w 
DON L, HARDING 
District Judge V 
a7q 
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CLERI('S CERTIFICATE OR SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY .that on the date indicated below, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document on the attomey(s) or person(s) listed below in the manner 
indicated. 
Atto~ney(s)/Persons(s): M&od of Service: 
Steven R. Fuller 
Steven R. Fuller Law Office 
24 North State 
Post Office Box 191 
Preston, Idaho 83263 
Telephone; (208) 852-2680 
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683 
Clyde G. Nelson 
City of Preston 
Attorney at Law 
172 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 797 
Sods. Springs, Idaho 83276 
Telephone: (208) 547-2135 
Facsimile: (208) 547.2136 
R A W  this & day of August, 2007. 
[ ] U.S. MaillPostage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[t.T FaosimiIe 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] U.S. MailPostage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[g F~simile 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
V. ELLIOT LARSEW 
Clerk of theDistrict Court 
By: $L/I~O,  #(I 
deputy Clerk 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERCD, ADJUDGED AND DECREED pursuant to this Court's 
Memorandu~n Decision and Ordevf ia chis case, dated August 16,2007, that Judgment i s  
hereby entered in favor of the City of Preston, Defendant. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
D DATED this & day of August, 2007. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the date below, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document on the attorney(s) or person(s) listed below in the manner indicated. 
Attorney(s)lPersons(s): Method of Senice: 
Clyde G, Nelson 
City of Preston 
Attorney at Law 
172 South Main Street 
Post OfBoe Box 797 
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276 
Telephone: (208) 547-2135 
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136 
Steven R. Fuller 
STEVEN R. FULLER LAW OFFICE 
24 North State 
Post Office Box 191 
Preston, Idaho 83263 
Telephone: (208) 852-2680 
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683 
[ ] US. MailPostage Prepaid 
[ 1 Overnight Mail 
[)(1 Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Court Box 
[ ] U.S. MailPostage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[)(3 Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Court Box 
DATED ihis j(D day o f  August, 2007, 
V. ELLIOTT LARSEN 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: 
Deputy Clerk 
CLYDE G. NELSON 
Attorney at Law 
172 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Telephone: (208) 547-2135 
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136 
Idaho Stare Bar No. 1197 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANIUIN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE, 1 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, 1 
and Scott Beckstead, Individually 1 
1 CASE NO. CV-2006-390 
Plaintiff, 1 
vs . ) MOTION FOR COSTS AND 
1 ATTORNEY FEES 
CITY OF PRESTON, 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
COMES NOW, Clyde G. Nelson, Attorney for Defendant City of Preston, and hereby 
moves that the court award attorney fees and costs as against the Plaintiffs Scott Beckstead Real 
Estate Company and Scott Beckstead, Individually, pursuant to Rule 54, I.R.C.P., Rule 68, 
I.R.C.P., 512-117, $12-120, and 512-121, Idaho Code. 
This Motion is based upon the judginent entered by the court in favor of the Defendant 
City of Preston on August 16, 2007, wherein the Defendant is the prevailing party. This Motion 
is supported by the Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson attached hereto together with the Mernora~ldutn 
of Costs and Attorney Fees. 
DATED t h i a a y  of August, 2007. 
RlOTION FOR COSTS 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I I-IEREBY CERTIFY that on t h i m  day of August, 2007, I served a tlue and correct 
copy of the foregoing docume~~t upon the following by US Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Steven R. Fuller 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Preston, ID 83263 
AFFIDAVIT 
CLYDE G. NELSON 
Preston City Attorney 
172 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Telephone: (208) 547-2 135 
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136 
Idaho State Bar No. 11 97 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE, 1 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, 
and Scott Becltstead, Individually 1 
CASE NO. CV-2006-390 
Plaintiff, 1 
vs . 1 AFFIDAVIT 
1 
CITY OF PRESTON, 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
State of IDAHO 1 
:ss 
County of Caribou ) 
COMES NOW Clyde G. Nelson, Attomey at Law, Soda Springs, Idaho, Attorney for 
Defendant, and upon oath duly deposes and says: . 
1. I an attorney for the City of Preston, Idaho: 
2. I charge the City of Preston the fee rate of $90.00 per hour, and all l~ourly charges as set 
forth in the Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees made a part of Defendant's Motion 
for Attorney Fees and Costs are true and correct to the best of nly lmowledge. Said fee 
rate is in conformance with or less than that charged by other attorneys with your affiant's 
experience in the Southeast portion of Idaho. 
3. On or about February 13,2007, I sent a letter to Steven R. Fuller, Attorney for Plaintiff 
wherein the City of Preston, Idaho, did offer to settle the case for the sum of $4,000.00 
payable to Mr. Beckstead. A copy of that'letter is attached hereto and tuade a part of this 
Affidavit as Exhibit "A". 
AFFIDAVIT OF CLYDE NELSON 
FEES AND COSTS 1 
4. 011 February 15, 2007, Steven R. Fuller sent a letter to me rejecting tlie offer made by tile 
City of Preston. A true copy of that letter is attached hereto and made a part of this 
Affidavit as Exhibit "B". 
5. On February 16, 2007 I mailed and faxed an Offer of Judgment dated February 16, 2007 
to Steven R. Fuller wherein the City of Preston did offer judgment in the sum of 
$5,000.00 as against it. A copy of the facsimile transmittal Inelno dated February 16, 
2007, showing that said Offer of Judgment was faxed to M i .  Fuller at 455  P.M. and that 
the same was mailed on the same date is attached hereto together with the Offer of 
Judgment as Exhibit "C". 
6.  No reply was made by the Plaintiff or Mr. Fuller to the Offer of Judgment. 
7. Pursuant to the Rules and Code Sections set fort1 in Defendant's Motion, the Defendant is 
entitled to recover its costs and attorney fees incurred in this matter. 
DATED t h i w y  of August, 2007 
SWSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before &e this day ,2007. 
Residing at Soda Springs 
AFFIDAVIT OF CLYDE NELSON 
FEES AND COSTS 
CITY O F  PRESTON 
CLYDE G. NELSON 
CITY ATTORNEY 
1 7 2  S .  Main 
P. 0 .  Box 797 
SODA SPRINGS, IDAHO 8 3 2 7 6  
TELEPHONE 
12081 5 4 7 - 2 1 3 5  
February 13,2007 
Facsimile (208) 852-2683 , , 
Steven R. Fuiler 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 191 
Preston, ID 83263 
Re: Bechtead v. City of Preston 
Case No. CV-06-390 
Dear Steve, 
I conferred with the City Council last night at its City Council meeting as to whether a 
meeting with Scott Beckstead would be productive at this stage. Council decided that as suit had 
been filed, that the Council would prefer that the attorneys handle this matter. I would appreciate 
a quick response as to whether the offer for settlement in the sum of $4,000.00 is acceptable to 
Scott. I would like to have your response before I prepare an .Answer to the Complaint and 
Response to your Discovery. 
The City Council did state that it would consider an alternative settlement by which Scott 
would be paid a portion of the amount he alleges is owing him based on the number of lots that 
he owned wh'ich were benefitted by the improvement and the potential number of lots which 
could be benefitted by the improvements. Darrell Wilburn has advised me that there are 32 
potential water connections of which five have already been made. Scott has 22 lots within his 
subdivision. The total number of lots would be 54. Scott was benefitted by the improvements by 
40.7% of the total expenditufe, and the intervening lots were benefitted to the tune of 59.3%. 
Scott estimates his cost at $10,600.00. Thus, Scott would be entitled to reimbursement in the 
sum of $6,285.80. Each intdrvening connection would pay the sum of $196.43 with the city 
paying that sum per lot for the five lots which have already been connected. The city would 
charge future intervenino, connections the sum of $196.43 for the improvement, and that sum 
would be paid directly to Scott upon the connection being made. The agreement would run for 
a period of five years from the date of completion of the water line improvements by Scott. 
Steven R. Fuller 
Re: Scott Beckstead v. City of Preston 
February 13,2007 
Page -2- 
After the five years have expired, the city would no longer be under any obligation to collect said 
sum from intervening users or to pay said sum to Scott. In the alternative, Scott could accept the 
$4,000.00, sign a release, and dismiss the suit with prejudice. 
Again, I would appreciate a prompt response as I must &aft the Response to your 
Discovery and Answer to your Complaint. The City CounciI appreciates the efforts being made 
by Scott and you to resolve this matter. 
Sincerely, 
/ffl&#7 Clv . Nelson 
CGN:wr 
cc: C i t y  o f  Preston 
STEYEN R. FULLER LAW OFEICE 
~comcys and Coi~~sclors at Law 
:J hORTH STATE * P.O. BOX 191 t PUSTOK. ID,\liO 53263 
STEYEN R FULLER' 
R. TODD CARBETI' 
February 15,2007 
Clyde G. Nelson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
SENT VIA TELEPHONE FACSIMILE 12081 547-2136 
Re: Becksfead v. City of Preston 
Franklin County Case Ng. CV-06-390 
Dear Clyde: 
I am in receipt of your loiter of February 13, 2007 and have had the opportunity cf 
reviewing the same with Scott Beckstead. 
We appreciate the offer that has been made, however, Scott has indicated to me I must 
respectfully deciine the same. 
I believe we need to proceed with the case so that it will be ready for trial in July. It may 
be that some, if not all of the issues may be resolved through summary judgment. 
Would you please provide your answers to discovery and an answer to the complaint so 
that the case will be at issue. 
Sincerelv. . , 
Steven R. Fuller 
Attorney at Law 
cc: Scott Beckstead 
CITY OF PRESTON 
CLYDE G. NELSON 
CITY ATTORNEY 
Telephone P.O. BOX 797,'172 5. MAIN Facsimile 
(208) 547-21 35 SODA SPRINGS, ID 83276 (208) 547-2 136 
FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL MEMO 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
DATE: February 16, 2007 
TO: Steven R. Fuller 
Attorney at Law 
Preston, I D  83263 
FAX: (208) 852-2683 1 
RE: Beckstead v: City of Preston 
NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER PAGE: 3 
COMMENTS: 
HARD COPY TO FOLLOW VIA U.S. MAIL X YES N O  
IF YOU D O  NOT RECEIVE ALL PAGES OF TRANSMISSION, PLEASE CALL 
(208) 547-2135 AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THANK YOU FOR YOUR QUICK RESPONSE. 
THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS TRANSACTION IS PRIVILEGED AND 
CONFIDENTIAL. IT IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY NAMED 
ABOVE. IF THE READER Q F  THIS MESSAGE 15 NOT THE INTENDED RECIPIENT, YOU ARE HEREBY 
AOTIFIED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION OR COPY OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS 
STKICT..Y PllOrl 3 -E!J B Y  LAW IF  YOU FAVE RECEIVED Tl-ilS C0~riMUhlCATlOrj IN ERROR, 
F .EASE kOT i\' - S 'NIwE3 ATELY BY TELEPIiOhE AhD RETLRN THE ORlGlnAL MESSAGE TO L.5 
AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS VIA U.S. POSTAL SERVICE. 
CLYDE G. NELSON 
Preston City Attorney 
172 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID. 83276 
Telephone: (208) 547-2135 
Fax: (208) 547-2136 
Idaho State Bar No.1197 
Attorney for: Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH jCTDIC1,AL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE, ) 
T 
, ): Case NP. CV-06-390 
Plairitiff, 
VS ) OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
CITY OF PRESTON, ) 
Defendant. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ) 
COMES NOW, CLYDE G. NELSON, attorney for Defendant, the City 
of Preston, Idaho, and hereby makes an Offer of Judgment to 
Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 68 I.R.C.P. in the sum of $5,000.00. 
Said offer includes all claims recoverable, including any attorney 
fees or costs recoverable under Rule 54(e) (I), Rule 54(d) (l), 
Section 12-117, I.C. or other applicable statue or rule which have 
accrued up to the date of the Offer of Judgment. 
DATED: This day of 
1; 
ney for City of Pres 
OFFER O F  JUDGMENT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby c e r t i f y  t h a t  a t r u e  and correct  copy of t he  foregoing 
Offer of Judgment was served by f i r s t  class mail, postage prepaid, 
o r  facs imi le ,  o r  hand delivered-on t h i s  16th day of February, 2 0 0 7 .  
Steven R.  Fu l le r  C x I U . S .  Mail 
Attorney a t  Law [ x I Facsimile 
P .O.  B o x  1 9 1  I I Hand Delivered 
Preston, I D  83263 
Facsimile ( 2 0 8 )  852-2683 
no 
Wendy D .  ~ a s d u + e n  
ur3 L C L ~  
OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
CLYDE G. NELSON 
Attorney at Law 
172 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Telephone: (208) 547-2135 
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136 
Idaho State Bar No. 1197 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE, 1 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, ) 
and Scott Beckstead, Individually 1 
1 CASE NO. CV-2006-390 
Plaintiff, 1 
vs. ) MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
1 AND ATTORNEY FEES 
CITY OF PRESTON, 1 
1 
Defendant. 1 
Pursuant to Rule 54(d)(5) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiffs submit the 
within the Memorandum of Costs iteinizing each claimed expense, cost, and disbwsements 
incurred by these proceedings: 
DESCRIPTION AMOUNTS 
+ See Itemized Billing Statemeilt attached $ 7,814.50 
hereto and made a part of this Memorandum. 
TOTAL $ 7,814.50 
Dated t h i s a d a y  of a /#- ,2007. 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Caribou ) 
I, Clyde G. Nelson, being first and duly swonl up011 oat11 duly depose and say: 
I am the Attorney for the City of Preston, Idaho in the above elltitled action, I have read 
the foregoing Memorandum of Costs, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, the iteills are 
correct and the costs and attorney fees claimed are in coinplia~ce wit11 Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure; and the facts therein stated are true and correct to tile best of illy lu~owledge. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this& day o 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
City of Preston 
70 West Oneida 
Preston, ID 83263 
CLYDE G. NELSON 
Attorney at Law 
P .  0 .  Box 797 - 172 S. Main Street 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
August 23,2007 
Our File: 2PRESTON.BECKSTEAD 
Statement of Account for Services Relidered Through August 23,2007 
RE: Scott Beckstead vs. City of Preston 
Professional Services 
1211 1/06 Telephoile conference w/ICRMP 0.50 45.00 
12/27/06 Telepholle confereilce w/Steve Fuller; attorney for Scott 0.25 22.50 
Beckstead 
Preparatioil of Notice of Appearance; Letter to Steve Fuller; 
Letter to Clerk of Court for filing of Notice 
01/08/07 Telephone coiiference w/Steve Fuller 
0 1/22/07 Review Letter received from Steve Fuller 
01/23/07 Telephone conference w/Steve Fuller 
01/25/07 Status Conferene w/Judge Harding and Steve Fuller - Court 
Scheduling Conference for Beckstead vs. Preston 
01/30/07 Telephone conference w/Steve Fuller 
Review and Calendar Trial Schedule 
02/05/07 Review Letter received from Steve Fuller 
02/13/07 Letter to Steve Fuller 
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August 23,2007 
City of Preston 
Scott Beckstead vs. City of Preston 
Our File: 2PRESTON.BECKSTEAD 
Description 
Review Letter received from Steve Fuller 
Prepare and Send Offer of Judgment to Steve Fuller 
Review Beckstead File; Make Notes and Prepare Initial 
DraA of Answer and Response to Discovery 
Conference w/Darrell Wilbum, Jerry Larsen and Linda 
Acock prior to City Council Meeting regarding Beckstead 
Case to prepare Answer and Response to Discovery 
Further Preparation of Answer; Further Preparation of 
Response to Request for Discovery; Review and Revise 
Revise Response to Request for Discovery; Make Copies of 
Response and Exhibits; Prepare Documents for Signatures 
and Filing with Court and sending to Steve Fuller 
Revise Answer to 1st Amended Co~nplaint of Beckstead 
02/28 - 0 110 1 Preparation of Interrogatories to Plaintiff 
Beckstead; Review and Revise 
Letter to Steve Fuller; Letter to Clerk of Court 
Letter to Jerry Larsen requesting connecton fees 
Telephone conference w/Dmell Wilbur~l; Telephone 
conferences w/Jeny Larsen (3); Telephone conferences 
w/Randy Quinn (2); Telephone conference w/Alex Hudson 
Telephone conference w/Darrell Wilburn; Review 
Beckstead Case File; Letter to Steve Fuller 
Telephone conferences w/Steve Fuller (2); Telephone 
conference w/Mayor Larson 
Telephone conference wIJudge Harding; Telephone 
conference w/Steve Fuller; Prepare Notice of Telephonic 
conference on Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Conlplaint 
Research amd Preoaration for Hearine and Areument: 
Telephone ~onfe;ence w/Judge Hard;lg and %eve ~u l l e r  




~ i t i  of  resto on 
Scott Beckstead vs. City of Presto11 
Our File: 2PRESTON.BECKSTEAD 
Hours Anlount 
8.00 720.00 05/19 - 05/21 Review 2nd Ainended Complaint; Prepare 
Answer to 2nd Amended Complaint; Prepare Disclosure of 
Witnesses and Exhibits; Prepare Supplelnental Disclosure; 
Prepare Notice of Service; Letter to Clerk of Court; Letter 
to Steve Fuller 
Telephone conference w/Steve Fuller 
Preparation of Stipulation and 0rder.to Extend time to File 
Motions for Summary Judgment 
Letter to Judge IHarding 
06/14 - 06/19 Further Research for Beckstead Case; Draft 
Motion for Summary Judgment; P)repare Affidavits and 
Memorandum 
Preparation of Motion to Continue Hearing Date on 
Argument for Summary Judgment; Prepare Notice of 
Hearing; Letter to Clerk of Court 
Conference w/Darrell Wilbur11 Discuss Beckstead Case and 
Affidavit 
Telephone conference w/Steve Fuller 
Prepare for Hearing on Motion to Continue Trial; 
Telephonic Conference Call with Judge Harding and Steve 
Fuller - Hearing on Motion to Continue 
Prepare Notes for File on Collfernce Call1 Prepare 
Stipulation; Prepare Order 
Review Atncnded Trial Schedule and Calendar 
Review Plaintiff's Brief and Affidavit of Scott Beckstead; 
Prepare Notes for Reply 
0711 8 - 0711 9 Prepare Defendant's Reply Me~nor~ladum; 
Review and Revise; Prepare Affidavit of Darrell Wilbunl; 
Prepare Affidavit of Clyde Nelson 
File Beckstead Case Reply Brief with Court in Preston 
File Beckstead Reply Brief with Court in Preston 
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August 23,2007 
City of Presto11 
Scott Beckstead vs. City of Preston 
Our File: 2PRESTON.BECICSTEAD 
Description & Amount 
07/24/07 Review Beckstead Response BrieT; Telephone conferences 2.00 180.00 
w/Darrell Wilbur11 (2); Prepare Affidavit of Darrell 
Wilburn; Prepare Affidavit of Jerry Larsen 
07/25/07 Prepare Oral Argument on Summary Judgment 4.00 360.00 
07/26/07 Court appearance - Oral Argument on-Suixnnary Judgment 3.50 315.00 
08/21/07 Review Memorandum and Decision 0.70 63.00 
08/22/07 Preparation of Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees; 4.00 360.00 
Preparation of Affidavit and Memorandum; Letter to Clerlc 
of Court; Letter to Steve Fuller 
Summary of Services 
Total Professional Services 85.75 $ 7,717.50 
Costs and Disbursements 
Date - Description Amoult 
12/28/06 Filing Fee paid to Franklin County Clerk of Court - Notice of Appearance 58.00 
02/28/07 Filiilg Fee - Answer to 1 st Amended Complaint 14.00 
08/22/07 Estimated Costs of Postage for Mailing Answer and Response to Discovery 25.00 
and Exhibits, Motion for Summary Judgment, Response Briefs, Affidavit 
and Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
Total Costs and Disbursemeilts $ 97.00 
TOTAL NEW CHARGES $ 7,814.50 
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August 23,2007 
City of Preston 
Scott Beckstead vs. City of Preston 
Our File: 2PRESTON.BECKSTEAD 
- -- 
Previous Balance Due 
SUMMARY OF ACCOUNT 
Balance Forward 
Total New Charges 
Payments and Credits 
TOTAL BALANCE DUE *** PLEASE PAY THIS AMOUNT ** 
Aged Balance 
TOTAL 
Current Over 30 Over 60 Over 90 
7814.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total 
7814.50 
STEVEN R. FULLER - 2995 
Steven R. Fuller Law Office 
24 North State 
P.O. Box 191 
Preston, ID 83263 
Telephone: (208) 852-2680 
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE 
COMPANY, an ldaho Corporation, and 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually, 
Plaintiffs, 
CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal 
Corporation, 
Defendant. I 
CASE NO. CV-06-390 
OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
COMES NOW, Scott Beckstead Real Estate Company, an ldaho Corporation, 
and Scott Beckstead, individually, Plaintiffs, by and through counsel of record, Steven 
R. Fuller, and hereby objects to the City of Preston's (hereafter "City") motion for costs 
and attorneys fees, as follows: 
The City's motion for attorneys fees and costs is based upon Rule 54 I.R.C.P., 
Rule 68, I.R.C.P., Section 12-1 17, Section 12-120, and Section 12-121, ldaho Code 
The City has also submitted an affidavit of counsel in support of the motion. No 
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memorandum or brief was submitted with the motion. Plaintiffs will review each of the 
rules and statutes cited by the City as part of this objection. 
Section 12-120 Idaho Code 
Section 12-120 provides for an award of attorneys fees to a prevailing 
party in specific situations. Cases involving amountsunder $25,000.00, open accounts, 
commercial transactions and some personal injury actions. The City does not state, 
specifically which section of the statute it wishes to invoke. 
Although the City inserted a standard or general request for attorney fee 
clause in its Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint, no request for attorneys fees was made in 
the City's Motion for Summary Judgment. Since the issue was not raised by the City, 
the Plaintiffs had no opportunity to respond to such a demand in their briefing to the 
Court. The Plaintiffs made their own request for attorneys fees in its briefing and the 
only mention of attorneys fees and costs in the City's briefing was in its Reply 
Memorandum arguing that Plaintiff should not be awarded attorneys fees and costs in 
this case. 
It is incumbent upon the City to ask for the relief it seeks in a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, including attorneys fees and costs if such are requested. The 
Court's own Memorandum Decision makes no mention of attorneys fees and costs 
being awarded to the City since it was not an issue raised by the City in its Motion. To 
now demand an award of attorneys fees and costs without having made such a 
demand part of its Motion or briefing places the Plaintiffs at a disadvantage and would 
allow the City to come in through the back door instead of the front, unfairly raising the 
issue after having not requested it in the first place. Our appellate courts have ruled 
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ldaho Code Section 12-120(1) must be narrowly construed. Anderson v. Goodliffe, 140 
ldaho 446, 449, 95 P.3d 64 (2004). Such narrow construction placed on the statute by 
our courts makes the necessity of requesting an award under this section imperative 
In Garner v. Barschi, 139 ldaho 430,438,80 P.3d 1031 (2003), a case 
with which this Court should be familiar, the Supreme Court upheld a denial of an 
award of attorneys fees stating: 
A party claiming attorneys fees must assert the specific statute, rule, 
or case authority for its claim. MDS Investmenfs, L.L.C. v. State, 138 
ldaho 456, 465, 65 P.3d 197, 206 (2003). It is not sufficient to make a 
generalized request for attorneys fees. Crea v. FMC Corp., 135 ldaho 
175, 181, I 6  P.3d 272, 272 (2000). It is incumbent on the moving 
partv to assert the arounds upon which it seeks an award of 
attornevs fees. The District Judae is not empowered to award fees 
on a basis not asserted bv the movincl pam. id.(quoting Bingham v. 
Montane Resource Assoc., 133 ldaho 420,424,987 P.2d 1035,1039 
(1 999). (emphasis added) 
The City, as the moving party in this case, did not assert any grounds nor 
any request for attorneys fees in its motion. 
Section 12-117, ldaho Code 
ldaho Code Section 12-1 17 provides for an award of attorneys fees and 
costs in which a City is involved, ..." If the Court finds that the party against whom the 
judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Again, the City 
did not request attorneys fees and costs under this Section of the Code in its Motion for 
Summary Judgment or briefing to the Court. .The absence of such a request is a flaw 
which the Court should not overlook and it would be error to award attorneys fees and 
costs under Section 12-1 17 or Section 12-120, ldaho Code, since they were not 
requested in the City's Motion in the first place. 
Objection - Page 3 
As the Court is aware from the facts of this case, it would be difficult to 
ascribe to the Plaintiffs that they were not reasonable in bringing a claim to the City for 
the pipeline installed by the Plaintiffs at Plaintiffs cost when a City Ordinance in effect at 
the time provided for reimbursement to the Plaintiffs for such costs. Although the Court 
has ruled the Plaintiffs should have filed a Notice of Claim within 120 days from when 
the project was completed, it cannot be said to be unreasonable for the Plaintiffs have 
made their claim when money was actually owed. At the completion of the project, no 
money was owed to the Plaintiffs, since monies would only be owed under the City 
Ordinance when water connections were made to the pipeline put in place by the 
Plaintiffs. It seemed illogical to the Plaintiffs to be required to file a claim which the City 
would have summarily denied since nothing was owed at the time of the project's 
completion. The Plaintiffs had a reasonable basis to believe a claim would arise only 
when a connection was made to the pipeline he had installed, if such a connection was 
ever made. The first connection was not made until a year later when the Plaintiffs 
made their claim for reimbursement. Until that time, there was no reimbursement to be 
made. 
Rule 68 I.R.C.P. 
Rule 68, I.R.C.P. is not applicable to this case. When an offer of 
judgment is made by the City, the purpose of that offer is to curtail an award of 
attorneys fees to the Plaintiff should the Plaintiff prevail in the case and receive as a 
judgment an amount equal to or less than the amount made in the offer of judgment. In 
this case, the City of Preston made an offer of judgment for the sum of $5,000.00, but 
that does not entitle the City to an award of attorneys fees because such offer was 
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made and the Court ruled against the Plaintiff. Rule 68, I.R.C.P. was not intended to 
provide for an award of attorneys fees. Ireland v. Ireland, 123 ldaho 955, 855 P.2d 40 
(1 993). The rule is intended to protect a defendant against a plaintiff's claim for costs 
where the defendant has made an offer of judgment and the verdict recovered by the 
plaintiff is less favorable than the offer. The Rule does not include an award of 
attorneys fees to the offeror. Vulk v. Haley, 112, ldaho 855, 736 P.2 1309 (1987). 
ldaho Code Section 12-121 and Rule 54(e) l l )  I.R.C.P. 
ldaho Code Section 12-1'21 provides for an award of attorneys fees 
in a civil action to a prevailing party, however, Rule 54(e)(l) states that attorneys fees 
under ldaho Code Section 12-121 "...may be awarded by the Court only when it finds, 
from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation; ..." In order for a Court to award 
attorneys fees and costs under the statute and rule, the City would have to reach the 
high standards set under Rule 54(e)(l) I.R.C.P. 
Under similar arguments made previously regarding ldaho code, 
Section 12-1 17, it would be stretching the rules to their breaking point to state the 
Plaintiffs' actions were frivolous or without just basis or cause. The claimant had a 
legitimate reason for wanting to be reimbursed for costs of the pipeline constructed by 
him. The Court's ruling that he should have filed his claim after the construction was 
completed is a matter for debate, as evidenced by both the facts and circumstances 
and the law of the case. It was not unreasonable for the Plaintiffs to believe he should 
have made his claim when monies became due after the first water connections were 
made to the pipeline he constructed. Had no water connections been made to the 
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pipeline, he would have had no claim for reimbursement at all under the City 
Ordinance. The Court's unfavorable ruling does not change the fact that the claim was 
legitimate and the time of the filing of the claim is subject to reasonable debate. 
Amount of the Claim for Attornevs Fees and Costs 
As to the costs claimed as a matter of right by the City in this 
action, under Rule 54(d)(l) I.R.C.P., such as the filing fees paid, Plaintiffs have no 
objection. However, estimated costs for postage in the amount of $25.00 is not a cost 
listed as being allowed under Rule 54(d)(l)(C) I.R.C.P., nor are "estimated" costs 
allowed but only those costs actually incurred which can be proven or shown. 
Under Rule 54(e)(3) I.R.C.P., the Court is required to consider 
certain factors in determining the amount of an award of attorneys fees. These are: (A) 
The time and labor required; (B) The novelty and difficulty with the questions; (C) The 
skill required to perform the legal service properly and the experience and the ability of 
the attorney in the particular field of law; (D) The prevailing charges for like work; (E) 
Whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (F)  he time limitations imposed by the client or 
the circumstances of the case; (G) the amount involved and the results obtained; (H) 
The undesirability of the case; (I) The nature and length of the professional relationship 
with the client; (J) Awards in similar cases; (K) The reasonable cost of automated legal 
research, if the Court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's case; (L) 
Any other factor which the Court deems appropriate in the particular case. 
None of the above factors which are to be considered by the Court were 
addressed in the City's motion. It is incumbent upon the City to present sufficient 
information for the Court to consider the factors required under the rules in order to 
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obtain an award of attorneys fees. Hackett v. Streeter, 109 Idaho 261, 264, 706 P.2d 
1372 (1 985) The affidavit of the City's counsel addresses issues of settlement offers 
made and in particular, the offer of judgment which has already been addressed in this 
objection. A settlement offer, or an offer of judgment, should not be considered as a 
basis for an award of attorneys fees. 
It should be noted that the City is seeking an award of attorneys fees which is 
approximately two-thirds of the entire amount involved in this claim. Such an award 
would be disproportionate and excessive when compared to the amount involved. The 
Court is required to take into account the amount involved in the case in determining 
what would be a fair award of attorneys fees, if such are granted. Rule 54(e)(3)(G). 
Summary. 
Absent a request for attorneys fees and costs in its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the City should not be granted such fees or costs. The claim 
made by the Plaintiffs was not unreasonable and the time period for filing a tort claim 
with the City is subject to reasonable debate. The amount of attorneys fees requested 
is excessive, especially given the amount at issue in the case. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray that the City's motion for attorneys fees and costs 
be denied. 
f i  
DATED this day of September, 2007. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY was served on the &day 
of September, 2007. 
On: 
CLYDE G. NELSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 797 
SODA SPRINGS, ID 83276 
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By: 
(/ MAIL, POSTAGE PRE-PAID 
- HAND DELIVERY 
v" 'TELEPHONE FACSIMILE 
(208) 547-21 36 
STEVEN R. FULLER - 2995 
Steven R. Fuller Law Office 
24 North State 
P.O. Box 191 
Preston, ID 83263 
Telephone: (208) 852-2680 
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE 
COMPANY, an ldaho Corporation, and 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually, 
PlaintiffsIAppellants, 
VS. 
ClTY OF PRESTON, a Municipal 
Corporation, 
CASE NO. CV-06-390 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE CITY OF PRESTON AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, CLYDE G. 
NELSON AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
Notice is hereby given that: 
1. Apoeal. The above-named Appellants, Scott Beckstead Real Estate 
Company, an ldaho Corporation, and Scott Beckstead, individually, appeal against the 
above-named Respondent, City of Preston, a Municipal Corporation, to the ldaho 
Supreme Court from the final Judgment entered in the above-entitled action on the 16'h 
day of August, 2007, the Honorable Don L. Harding, presiding. 
Notice of Appeal - Page 1 
2. Riuht to Appeal. The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho 
Supreme Court, and the Judgment or Order described in paragraph 1 above is an 
appealable judgment and order under and pursuant to Rule I l(a)(l), I.A.R. 
3. Preliminarv Statement of Issues on A~peal .  (1) Whether or not the 
Appellants complied with the requirements of Preston City Ordinance 16.28.030(8). (2) 
Whether or not Appellants filed a timely claim' under the idahc Tort Claims Act. 
4. Is a Reporter's Transcript Requested? N'o. 
5 .  Clerk's Record. The Appellants request that the following documents to 
be included in the Clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 
28, I.A.R. 
(a) All briefs, affidavits with exhibits, memoranda, orders, minute entries, 
memorandum decision by the Court, motions and other documentation contained in the 
Court file. 
6. Service. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Clerk of 
the District Court: 
(b) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been 
paid; 
(c) That the Appellant filing fee has been .paid; 
(d) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20 I.A.R. 
Notice of Appeal - Page 2 
@ 
DATED this day of September, 2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
APPEAL was served on the &day of September, 2007. 
On: By: 
Clerk of the District Court MAIL, POSTAGE PRE-PAID 
Franklin County, Idaho 7HAND DELIVERY 
39 East Oneida TELEPHONE FACSIMILE 
Preston, ID 83263 
Clyde G. Nelson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
L ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  POSTAGE PRE-PAID 
- HAND DELIVERY 
TELEPHONE FACSIMILE 
Notice of Appeal - Page 3 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE !Ji :pi t ' i  .i 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
* * * * * *  
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, and 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually, 
VS. 
CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal 
Corporation, 
Supreme Court No. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
Appeal from: Sixth Judicial District, Franklin County 
Honorable Don L. Harding 
Case number from court: CV-06-390 
Order or judgment appealed from: Memorandum Decision and Order 
Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment AND Judgment 
Attorney for Appellant: Steven R. Fuller 
Steven R. Fuller Law Ofice 
PO Box 191 
Preston, ID 83263 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL- 1 
Attorney for Respondent: Clyde G. Nelson 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Appeal by: Plaintiffs 
Appeal against: Defendants 
Notice of Appeal filed: September 25, 2007 
Appellate fee paid: Yes 
Request for additional (clerk's) record filed: No 
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No 
Was reporter's transcript requested? No 
Name of reporter: Dorothy Snarr 
Dated this 1'' day of October, 2007. 
V. ELLIOTT LARSEN 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 2 3@ 
CLYDE G. NELSON 
Attorney at Law 
172 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Telephone: (208) 547-2135 
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136 
Idaho State Bar No. 1197 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE DrSTIUCT COURT OF THE SMTH JUDICIAL DlSTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, I N  AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE, 1 
COMPANY, an l&ho Corpomtion, 1 
and Scott Becksteed, Individually 1 




) DEFENDANT'S MEM0RANI)IIM 
) IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
) AND MEMORANDUM OF 
CITY OF PRESTON, ) COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES 
1 
Dtfcndant . 1  
The Court issued Summary Judgment in favor of the Defendant and against thc I'laintill' 
Plaintiff and Defendant each submitted aMotion for Summary Judgment. The Court considered thc 
same after Hearing, and issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and issucd Judgment 
on August 16, 2007. On August, 22, 2007, the Defendant submitted its Motion for C'osts nnd 
Attorney Fees and Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. The Plaintiffsubmitted an Ohjectiol) 
to Defendant's Request for Costs and Attorney Fees dated September 6.2007 The court set Noticc 
of Hearing on Plaintiffs Requested for Attorney Fees and Costs on September 19. 2007 
DEFENDANTS -Bs RWQkT(K 
MOTION FOR ~ - m A n o  cdstg 1 
The relevant portions of applicable Statutes or Rules are set forth as follows: 
$12-117, Idaho Code 
12-117 ATTORNEY'S FEES, WITNESS FEES AND EXPENSES 
AWARDED IN CERTAIN INSTANCES. 
(1) Uilless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or 
civil judicial proceeding involving'as adverse parties a state agency, 
a city, a coullty or other taxing district aud a person, the court shall 
award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and 
reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the 
judgmeilt is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
312-120, Idaho Code 
12-120 ATTORNEY'S FEES IN CIVIL ACTIONS. 
(1) Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, in 
any action where the amouilt pleaded is Twenty-five Thousa~d 
dollars ($25,000) or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the 
prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasollable 
amount to be fixed by the court as attorney's fees. 
$12-121. Idaho Code 
12-121 ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to 
the prevailing party or parties, provided that this section shall not 
alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for the 
award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or "parties" is defined to 
include any person, partnership, corporation, association, private 
organization, the state of Idaho or political subdivisioil thereof. 
Rule 54(d)(l). Costs - Items allowed. 
(A) Parties Entitled to Costs. Except when othe;wise limited by these 
rules, costs shall be allowed as amatter of right to the prevailiilg party 
or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
(B) Prevailing Party. In determilling which party to an action is a 
prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its s o u ~ d  
discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in 
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court 
in its sound discretion may determine that a party to an actioll 
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prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may 
apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and 
equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims 
involved in the action and the resultant judgment or judgments 
obtained. 
Rule 54(d)(5). Memorandum of costs. 
At any time after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court, any 
party who claims costs may file and serve on adverse parties a 
memorandum of costs, itemizing each claimed expense, but such 
memorandum of costs may not be filed later tlxan fourteen (14) days 
after entry ofjudgment. Suchmemorandum~nust statethat to the best 
of the party's knowledge and belief the items are correct and that the 
costs claiilled are in compliance with this ~ule.  Failure to file such 
memorandum of costs within the period prescribed by this rule shall 
be a waiver of the right of costs. A memorandum of costs prematurely 
filed shall be considered as timely. 
Rule 54(e)(l). Attorney fees. 
In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, 
which at the discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the 
prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when 
provided for by any statute or contract. Provided, attorney fees under 
section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the court only when 
it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, 
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasol~ably or without foundation; 
but attorney fees shall not be awarded pursuant to section 12-121, 
Idaho Code, on a default judgment. 
Rule 54(e)(4). Pleading -- Default Judgments. 
It shall not be necessary for anyparty in a civil action to assert a claim 
for attornev fees in any pleading; provided, however, attorney fees, 
when claimed to be allowable by contract or statute other than section 
12-121, Idaho Code, shall not be awarded unless the prayer for relief 
in the complaint states that the party is seeking attorney fees and the 
dollar amount thereof in case judgment is entered by default. Any 
award of attorney fees in default judgments shall be subject to the 
other provisions of this Rule 54(e), and shall not exceed the amount 
prayed for in the complaint. Any award of attorney fees pursuant to 
LC. Section 12-120, in default judglilents in which the defendant has 
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not appeared shall not exceed the anlount of the judgment for the 
claim, exclusive of costs. 
Rule 54(e)(5). Attorney fees as costs. 
Attorney fees, when allowable by statute or contract, shall be deemed 
as costs in an action and processed in the sane manner as costs and 
included in the memorandum of costs; provided, however, the claim 
for attorney fees as costs shall be supported by an affidavit of the 
attorney stating the basis and method of computation of the attorney 
fees clain~ed. 
Rule 68. Offer of Judgment. 
(a) At any time more than 14 days before the trial begins, a party 
defending against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer 
to allow judgment to be taken against the defending party for the 
money or property or to the effect specified in the offer, which offer 
of iudrrment shall be deemed to include all claims recoverable, 
4 - 
including any attorneys fees awardable under Rule 54(e)(l), and any 
costs awardable under Rule 54(d)(l), which have accrued up to the . . .  . 
date of the offer ofjudgment. 
Rule 68(b)(l). 
If the adjusted award obtained by the offeree is less than the offer, 
then: 
(i) the offeree must pay those costs of the offeror as allowed under 
Rule 54(d)(l), incurred after the making of the offer; 
After a comparison of the offer and the adjusted award, in appropriate 
cases, the district court shall order an amount which either the offeror 
or the offeree must ultimately pay separate and apart from the amount 
owed under the verdict. A total judgment sl~aIl.be ntered taking into 
account both the verdict and the involved costs. 
Authority Citation 
In its Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendant requested that Plaintiff's clainl be 
dismissed and that Defendant recover fiorn Plaintiff its attorney fees and costs pursuant to $12-1 17, 
12-120, and 12-121, Idaho Code. In its Reply Memorandum to Plaintiffs Motion for Su~nmary 
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Judgment, Defendant denied that Plaintiff sl~ould be awarded attorney fees and requested that 
attorney fees be awarded to it. In its Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees, the Defendant requested 
attorney fees and costs pursuant to 512-1 17,12-120, and 12-121, Idaho Code as well as pursuant to 
Rule 54 and Rule 68, I.R.C.P. 
The Plaintiff argues that Defendant is required to have claimed attorney fees and costs in its 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Otherwise, the Plaintiff argues, Plaintiff has had no opportunity to 
respond. Plaintiff cites no authority for the argument that a request for attorney fees must be 
contained in a Motion for Summary Judgment. Rule 54(e)(4) I.R.C.P. specifically states that it is 
not necessary for any party in a civil action to assert a claim for attorney fees in any pleading. 
Nevertheless, the City has asserted the specific statutes on which it relied as authority for award of 
costs and attorney fees in its Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint'a~ld again has set forth that authority 
in its Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs. Rule 68 was not asserted in the Answer as an Offer of 
Judgment is not to be filed with the Court. Rule 54(c)(5) requires the Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees to be submitted "after the verdict of a jury or a decision of the court". Pursuant to 
g12-117, 12-120 and 12-121 as well as Rule 54, attorney fees and costs may be awarded only to the 
prevailing party. The prevailing party is not knowil prior to judgment being entered. It would be 
premature and presumptuous to argue attorney fees and costs prior to the decision of the court. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs assertion, the Plaintiff has the oppollunity to respond to Defenda~t's Request 
for Attorney Fees and Costs by filing an Objection pursuant to Rule 54(d)(6) and Rule 54(e)(6), 
I.R.C.P. Plaintiff has done so, and is now responding to Defendant's request. A hearing is set, and 
the Plaintiff will have the opportunity to be heard. 
The Plaintiff cites Garner v. Barschi, 139 Idaho 430,438. In that case, following Sunlrnarjr 
Judgment in favor oE Barschi, Barschi submitted a Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees 
pursuant to Rule 54. However, Barschi failed to cite 11er authority for attorney fees within its request 
either through contract or by statute. The Memorandum was a Request for Attorney Fees and Costs 
without any underlying authority for award of the same. The court ruled that as Barschi had neither 
cited any provision of the contract or any statute for authority to award attorney fees, and as she had 
failed to list the work performed, that tile request should be denied. The Plaintiff also cites MDS 
Investments, L.L.C. v. State, 138 Idaho 456,465 and Crea v. FMC Corp., 135 Idaho 175,181 for the 
proposition that the specific statute, rule or case authority must be asserted by the prevailing party. 
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InMDS the party requesting attorney fees had failed to cite ',any statute, rule or case law supporting 
its claim for attorney fees ..." 138 Idaho 465. I11 Crea, not only did the claimant fail to assert any 
statute as a basis for attorney fees, it failed to request attorney fees in its cost bill and did not file an 
affidavit from which the court could establish the basis of an award of attorney fees. The 
requirement for the citation of authority for attorney fees and costs is merely to direct the court's 
attention to the relevant statute under which the claimant is making claim. The City has done so in 
this case, not only in its Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint, but also in its Motion, Affidavit, and 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. In this case, the Motion is supported by an Affidavit of 
counsel and a very specific and detailed Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. 
Nevertheless, the cases cited by Plaintiff have been overruled or seriously co~nproinised by 
the case of Eighteen Mile Ranch, L.L.C. v. NordExcavating & Paving, Inc. 141 Idaho 716,117 P.3d 
130 (2005). In that case the Defendant had not asserted its claim for attorney fees in its Answer or 
Counterclaim. It first asserted the same in its Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. The court 
quoting Rule 54(e)(4) I.R.C.P. ruled that it is not necessary for a party to list a specific attorney fee 
provision in its pleadings in order to obtain a fee award when it is the prevailing party. The court 
stated: 
Having concluded that the Nords and the Company were prevailing 
parties, we must now decide whether they adequately supported their 
request for fees. It is well established that "[a] party claiming 
attorney's fees must assert the specific statute, rule, or case authority 
for its claim." MDS 
Invs., Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 456,465,65 P.3d 197,206 (2003). See 
also Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 79 P.3d 723 (2003). The 
Shelbys contend that the Nords failed to cite a rule, statute, or other 
authority in support of their request for fees. The Shelbys are wrong. 
In their initial and subsequent fee requests the Nords and the 
Company cited LC. $ 5  12-120, and requested fees "as a matter of 
costs because this was a commercial transaction as defined by Idaho 
Code $5 12-120." We see nothing defective in this fee request. While 
it does not specifically refer to subsection (3) of I.C. $3 12-120, it 
adequately identifies the ground under which fees are sought. 
The Shelbys contend that a prevailing party may not be awarded 
attorney fees unless it has stated in its pleadings the specific code 
section upoil which it will rely for a fee award. Such a contention 
does find some support in the case law. For example, in Jenkins v. 
Donaldson, 91 Idaho 71 1,715,429 P.2d 841,845 (1 967), fees were 
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denied for failtire to request the same in a pleading. However, this 
result is at odds with Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(4) which states, "It shall 
not be necessary for any party in a civil action to assert a claim for 
attorney fees in any pleading . . . ." The proviso followiilg this 
language is worded somewhat a w k k d l y  but it appears the proviso 
is intended to set out a different requirement for,judg~llents by default 
-that the fee statute (other than section 12-121) or contract provision 
and amount of any fee award sought be specifically stated in the 
prayer of the complaint as a preconditioll to obtaining fees in a 
judgment by default. Rule 54(e)(4) did not exist at the time Jenkiizs 
was decided. It did not become effective until March 1, 1979. By 
virtue ofthe adoption of Rule 54(e)(4), the Jenkins holding has been 
superseded and has no further validity. Thus, a party need not have 
listed a specific attorney fee provision in its pleading in order to 
obtain a fee award under that provisioxi upon prevailing in the 
litigation. While it is obviously the better practice to specify the fee 
request in the pleading, both to preserve a claim for fees in the event 
of a default and to put the opposing party on notice of the fee claim, 
failure to do so is not fatal to a fee claim in a contested matter. And, 
of course, a party must specify, in its Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(e)(5) fee 
request, the code section or contract provisioil pursuant to which it 
makes the fee request. I-Iere, the Nords and Nord Excavating did so 
in their initial memorandum of costs and attorney fees, citing tile 
commercial transaction ground, which is set forth in subsection (3) of 
I.C. $ 5  12-120. They are not prevented from seelcing an award just 
because their answer or coullterclail~l did not specifically designate 
this provision. (pp. 720-721) See also nit is  v. Liddle & Moeller 
Const., Inc. 2007 Idaho (32089) 
prevail in^ Party 
Rule 54(d)(l)B states that to determine tlle prevailing party, tlie court should consider the 
final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The 
Plaintiff sought recovery for a sum in excess of $13,000.00 plus his attorney fees. The Defendailt 
denied that it had any liability or responsibility to tile Plaintiff. The Court ruled that the Plaintiff had 
failed to comply with the terms and conditions of the Ordinance prior to colnme~lcing construction, 
and also failed to timely file its Notice of Claim within the 180 day time period. Judgment was 
granted in favor of the Defendant, and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment was denied. 
Therefore, the Defendant avoided all liability, and ithe Plaintiff received nothing from his Complaint. 
The Defendant is the prevailing party. 
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In Eighteen Mile Ranch, supra the district court ruled in favor of the defendants aud denied 
any recovery to plaintiff. The court only awarded a slllall sum to defendant Nord on its 
counterclaim. The district court ruled that neither party had prevailed, taking into consideration 
Nord's small recovery on its counterclaim. The Supreme Court reversed finding that Nord was the 
prevailing party in that it had avoided all liability. The court stated: 
Viewing its success from an overall standpoint, Nord Excavating was 
a prevailing party. In ruling it was not, the district court focused too 
much attention on the Company's less than trenlendous success on its 
counterclaim and seemingly ignored the fact that the Company 
avoided all liability as a defendant. The district court improperly 
undervalued the Conlpany's successfbl defense. Avoiding liability is 
a significant benefit to a defendant. In baseball, it is said that a walk 
is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more exciting. In litigation, 
avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a nloney 
judgment is for a plaintiff. Tlle point is, while a plaintiff with a large 
money judgment may be nlore exalted tl~an a defendant who simply 
walks out of court no worse for the wear, courts must not ignore the 
value of a successful defense. In this case, logic suggests that a 
verdict in Nord Excavating's favor and a victory on its counterclaim 
(albeit, a relatively small one), by definition, makes it a prevailing 
party. 141 Idaho 719 
512-120 Idaho Code 
$ 12-120(l) provides in any action for less tl~an $25,000.00, "there shall be taxed and allowed 
to the prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable anlount to be fixed by the court 
as attorney's fees." There is no requirement under $12-120 that the Court find the Plaintiff pursued 
the case frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, as set forth in Rule 54(e)(l) I.R.C.P. That 
requirement applies only to awards of attorney fees and costs pursuant to $21-121, Idaho Code. The 
provisions of this Section are mandatory (See Eighteen Mile Ranch, L.L.C., supra, where the court 
ruled that a Defendant who avoided liability was the prevailing party and entitled to attorney fees 
pursuant to $12-120, Idaho Code.) See also Fritts v. Liddle & Moeller, supra. 
812-117, Idaho Code 
The provisions of § 12-1 17 require the court to award the prevailing party reasonable attorney 
fees and costs if the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis 
in fact or law. While the provisions of $12-120, Idaho Code, slzodd izzandate tlze award of attorney 
fees, the court may also rely upon $12-1 17 in this award. The only question that tlze court has to 
determine under this Section is wlzether the Plaintiff acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
The provisions of the ordinance upon wlzich the Plaintiff relied were explicit. The Plaiiztiff 
had to make a request to the City that it wished to be reimbursed for its coltstructioiz costs. Tlze sane 
would be submitted to the City, aizd tlze City would cause competitive bids to be obtained. The 
Plaintiff never nzade the City aware of his request that he wanted to be reimbursed, altlzough fully 
aware of his costs at the time of construction. The Plaintiff waited one year before he even notified 
the City through his letter of October, 2004, that he wanted to meet with the City to discuss 
reimbursement. Thus, the court ruled that t11e Plaintiff had failed to conzply wit11 tlze provisions of 
the Ordinance, aizd had further failed to conzply with the Notice of Claim provisions. Plaintiff was 
fully aware that it had not complied with the Ordinance or the Notice of Claim provisions in tlzat 
Plaintiffs attorney submitted a Notice of Claim in 2006, nearly tluee years later. There was no 
reasonable basis of fact or law upon which the Plaintiff could rely in bringing its claim. Thus, the 
Defendant is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs based upon $12-1 17, Idalzo Code. 
s12-121. Idaho Code. 
$12-121 allows an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party. This code section is 
limited by Rule 54(e)(l) wlzich requires the court to determine whether the Plaintiff brouglzt or 
pursued its claim frivolously, u~ueasonably, or witl~out foundation. For the reasons set fort11 in 
argument for award of attorney's fees under 5 12-1 17, tlze Defendant would contend that Plaintiffs 
claim was frivolous and without foundation. Failure to colnply with tlze Ordinance, and failure to 
timely file a Notice of Claim, prevented tlze Plaintiff from proceeding with his action. To have 
pursued it, regardless of tlze Ordinance or failure to timely file Notice of Claim, is frivolous aizd 
unreasonable. 
Rule 68 I.R.C.P. 
As set fortlz in Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs aizd the accompa~zying 
Affidavit aizd attachments thereto, tlze Defendant nzade two offers ofjudgment. The first was for 
$4,000.00, which was rejected by letter from Mr. Fuller. The second was for $5,000.00 in the nature 
of a formal Rule 68 Offer, and no response was made to tlzat offer by Defendaut. The Plaintiff cites 
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Ireland v. Ireland, 123 Idaho 955 (1993) as authority for the position that Rule 68 does not allow a 
Defendant to recover altorney fees. The Plaintiff also cites the case of Vulkv Haley, 112 Idaho 855 
(1987). Both cases were decided under the former Rule 68 which was rescinded in 1997. The new 
Rule 68, requires the offeree to pay the costs of the offeror. Further, the Rule goes on to state: 
"After a conlparison of the offer and the adjusted award, in 
appropriate cases, the district court shall order an amount which 
either the offeror of the offeree must ultimately pay separate and apart 
from the amount owed under the verdict. A total judg~ne~lt shall be 
entered talcing illto account both the verdict and the iilvolved costs." 
Rule 54(e)(5) reads as follows: 
"Attorney fees, when allowable by statute or contract, shall be 
deemed as costs in an action and processed in the same manner as 
costs and included in the Memorandum of Costs; provided, llowever, 
the claim for attorney's fees as costs supported by an affidavit of the 
attorney stating the basis and method of computation of the attorney 
fees claimed." 
Thus, attorney fees are treated as costs pursuant to Rule 54. Rule 68 now allows the offeror 
to recover its costs where the offeree has rejected the offer. As attorney fees are treated as costs, and 
as the Plaintiff rejected the Offer, the Defendant should recover its attorney fees and costs pursuant 
to Rule 68. 
Amount of Attorney Fees and Costs 
The amount of attorney fees and costs claimed by the Defendant are reasonable. PlaintiR 
filed three different Complaints in this action. The Defendant filed an Answer to the First Amended 
Complaint, and after hearing upon a Motion to Amend, filed an Answer to the Second Anlended 
Complaint. There was voluminous discovery done by both the Plaintiff and Defendant in this case. 
Response toDiscovery required extensive interview of witnesses and the obtaiuing of docunents to 
provide to Plaintiff. Disclosures of Witnesses aild Suppleinental Disclosure were presented. 
Motions for Summary Judgment, Responses to those Motions, and several Affidavits were required 
in order to properly respond. Hearings were held. The total hours submitted by the Defendant for 
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by the Plaintiff in pursuing its claim, is not unreasonable. Furthermore, Defendant's counsel billed 
the Defendant at the rate of $90.00 per hour, arate much lower than that he charges other clients, and 
far below the standard rate charged in the Southeast Idaho area. Defendant's cou~sel has nearly forty 
years experience in the practice of law. He has practiced in the Southeast Idaho area for 33 years. 
The Defendant has documented the time and labor required as a result of Plaintiffs pursuit of this 
action necessary to avoid liability to his client, and obtained the most favorable outcome that could 
possibly be achieved. The time and labor involved in the defense of this case is well documented. 
The Plaintiff would argue that the Defendant should not recover its attorney fees and costs, as they 
are "approximately 213 of the entire unount involved in this clainl." However, the Plaintiff fails to 
cite any statute or rule which prohibits the award of attorney fees which may constitute a substantial 
sum in relation to the amount claimed by the Plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the Rules, Statutes, and case law referred to above, the Defendant is entitled 
to an award of attorney fees and costs in the amount claimed plus time required for briefing and 
arguing Plaintiffs objections. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
Dated this @ay o f / y e , ~  u 0 0 7 ,  
DEFENDAUT'S i \ lE l lOR\ND( ' \ I  1s SCPPORT OF 
\IOl iOV FOR AI.TOIIYE\' TTES .AND C O S l S  11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was served by first 
class mail, postage prepaid, by facsimile, or hand delivered on this 4"' day of October, 2007, to 
the following: 
Steven R. Fuller 
Attorney at Law 
24 North State St. 
P.O. Box 191 
Preston, ID 83263 
[x ] U.S. Mail 
[x ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL-DIST ~n&kL 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT/ OF FRANKLIN 
SC07T BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, 
Plaintiff(s), I Case No. CV-2006-390 
vs / MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
CITY OF PRESTON, a Municrpai 
Corporation, 
DATE: October 11, 2007 
APPEARANCES: Steven R. Fuller, Attorney for Plaintiff 
Clyde G, Nelson, Attorney for Defendant 
MATTER BEFORE THE COURT: Motlon for Costs and Attorney Fees 
PROCEEDINGS: At the outset the Court heard oral argument from respective counsel 
regarding said motion. The Court: wlll review the briefs submitted and take this matter 
under advisement for approximately 30 days. 
DATED: October 11,2007 
4 2 3 6 2 w  
DON L. MARDING 
Dlstrict Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGISERVICE 
I herebv certifv that on October 1Q.2007,l mailed/served/faxed a true cowv of the 
foregoing dodurnent' on the att~rne~(s)/~erso'n(s) listed below by mail with correct 
postage thereon or causing the same to be hand delivered. 
Attornev(s)lPerson(s1: Method of Service: 
Steven R. Fuller 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Clyde G. Nelson 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Faxed to; 852-2683 
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IN IN DI6TMCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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S T A m  OF IDAH[O, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKJJN, : : I 
. '  . .  . . . . :'LE'!., ' -' f~~ ,
) 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE ) CaseNo. CV-2006-390 
COMPANY, An Idaho Corporation, ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
Plaintiff, ) ORDER DENYING IN PART APJD 
) GRANTING IM PART DEFENDANT'S 
VS. ) MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
1 FEES 
CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal Corporation3 
1 
Defendant. 1 
THE MATTER BEFORE THE COURT: 
This matter is back before the Court onDefendant's Mooliorafor Costs mdAtrorney Fees. 
This case first came before the Court on September 8,2006, when the Plaintiff filed a complaint 
against the Defendant seeking reimbursement for work he had performed pursuant to Preston, 
Idaho) City Ordinance S;16.28.030('). Both parties moved for Summary Judgment. The Court 
granted Defendant's Motionfor Summmy Judgment and entered Judgment on August 16,2007. The 
Defendant timely filed the motion at bar and submitted supporting affidavits and briefs on August 
24,2007, The Plaintiff filed an Objection to Defendant's motion for Costs andAttorneys Fees on 
September 6,2007. A hearing .was held on October 1 I, 2007, at which time the Cout took the 
matter under advisement. Ahr reviewing rhe record and the material submitted by the parties the 
Court now issues the following Memorandum Decision and Order regarding the costs and attorney 
fees, 
Beckstead v. Preston Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants Motion for Attorney 1 
fees and Costs 
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ISSUES PRESENTED: 
1. Is the Defendant entitled to an award of costs7 
2, Is the Defendant entitled to an award of attorney fees? 
ANALYSIS: 
A. The Defendant is Entitled to a ~ a r t i a i ~ w a r d  of COS~B, 
Rule 54(d)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in the exercise of its 
discretion, the heal court may @ant a prevailitlg party certain costs as a matter of right. More 
specifically the rule provides that a prevailing party may be awarded the following: 1) court 
filing fees, 2) fees for service of documents, 3) fees for expert witnesses 4) reasonable costs of 
the preparation of models, maps, pictures, photographs, or other exhibits admitted in evidence, 5) 
charges for reporting or transcribing of a deposition, and 6) charges for one copy of any 
deposition, Rule 54(d)(l)(C), Furthermore, the determination of who is a prevailing party for 
the purposes of this rule is left to the Court's discretion. 54(d)(l)@). The Court is .to determine 
who prevails by looking at the find judgment in relation to the relief sought by the respective 
parties. Id 
The record shows that on August 16,2007 the Conrt entered a judgment in favor of the 
Defendant because he escaped FLU liability claimed by Plaintiff. The Defendant is therefore the 
prevailing party in this matter and as such, it is proper to a\vard costs as a matter of right. 
However, Defendant fails to distinguish between costs claimed as a matter of right and 
discretionary costs in his Memorendurn in support ofMotionfor and Memorandurn of Costs and 
Attorney Fees. Furthermore, Rule 54(d)(l)(C) does not allow for estimated postage fees therefore 
the Court will not award the Defendant the $25.00 in costs which it deems are discretionary, 
These discretionary costs are not shown to be necessary or exceptional to this case therefore the 
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Court will not award the discretionary costs of $25.00 for estimated postage. Those costs claimed 
by Defendant in the August 24,2007 memorandum which are allowable under Rule 54(d)(l) are 
as follows: 
i ,  Filiig Fees for notice of ap earance . . , ! $58.00 ii. Filing Fees for answer to l b e n d e d  complaint $14.00 
Total of Costs as a Matter of Right. $72.00 
These costs qualify as costs as a matter of right under Rule 54(d)(l) and Plaintiff does not 
object to them, thus the Court will award them. 
B. The Defendant i s  Not Entitled to an Award of Attorneys Fees. 
Defendant claims attorney fees in the amount of $7,717.50 under LC. $5 12.117, 12-120, 
12-121 and under 1,R.C.P. 68 and 54(e)(l). The Court will address each application of the 
statutes and rules to the facts ofthis case. 
LC. @ 12-1 17 provides for an award of attorney fees and costs in which a municipality is 
involved as long as the person against whom judgment was rendered acted without a reasonable 
basis in faot or law. LC, 5 12.1 17(2). The Court i s  left to determine whether a party acted with or 
without a reasonable basis of law or fact, LC, 8 12-1 17(1). 
The Court cannot in good conscious declare that Plaintiff acted without a reasonable 
basis of fact or law in this case. The root ofthe matter involves a city ordinance which was 
subject to differing interpretations. Varying interpre'tations provide a reasonable basis in law on 
which the case was brought, The facts of the case provided a reasonable basis for the 
interpretations because Plaintiff had performed the work and he felt he was entitled to 
reimbursement under his interpretation of the city ordinance. A reasonable person may well 
interpret the City ordinance in the same manner as the Plaintiff had. 
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The allegation by Defendant that this case was pursued frivolously fails because the City 
ordinance could have been interpreted either way. It may be the very ambiguous nature of the 
ordinance which has caused the City to repeal it. A review of the facts of this case shows tbat 
Mr. Beckstead had conversed with one of the City's engineers who advised him ofthis 
ordinance. Mr. Beckstead could have reasonably relied on this information in pursing this matter. 
Mr. Beckstead argued that any toliing of time restrictions should not commence until he sent a 
letter on October 22,2004. While this argument did not convince the Court that the time 
limitations for filing a claim against b e  City should begin tolling from this date, this argument 
does provide a reasonable basis on which to pursue the claim legally. This was not an unfounded 
claim. 
Next the Court looks at an application of I.C. 12-121 and Rule 54(e)(l) to this case. 
These rules provide that a court may properly award attorney fees to a prevailing party if the 
Court determines that the opposing party brought, pursued, or defended& action frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. Rule 54(e)(l). An award of attorney fees must also be 
accompanied with factual findings providing a basis and reason fot the award, Rule 54(e)(Z). 
Where the record and arguments do not lead to the conclusion that the action was brought, 
pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation attorney fees are 
inappropriate, Tirtsdalc v. I'insdale, 127 Idaho 331 (Ct, AppJ995). Finally, the decision to award 
attorney fees rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Caldwell v, Idaho Youth Raoch, 
132 Idaho 120,986 P.2d 215 (1998). 
The Court does not feel that there is afactual basis upon which to base an award. As 
discussed above, the case was not brought frivolously, nor does the record indicate that the case 
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was pursued unreasonably or without foundation. The Plaintiff based his claims on facts which 
he considered wouid help him prevail in the matter. 
Defendant has claimed attorney fees under Rule 68 which, "includes all claims 
recoverable, including any attorneys fees awardable under Rule 54(e)(l)." See I.R.C.P. 68. As 
stated above this Court has determined that no attorney fees are to be awarded under Rule 
54(e)(l) because the action was not pursued frivoIously. The Court awarded costs as a matter of 
right in the amount of $72.00 which is also allowed for under this rule in conjunction with Rule 
54(d)(l). However, because an award of attorneys fees under Rule 68 relies upon Rule 54(e)(l) 
the Court cannot award attorneys fees utilizing this rule as it would conflict with the Courts 
decision as to whether the oase was pursued frivolously. 
As stated above the Court deems that there was a reasonable basis in law and fact for this 
case to be brought and pursued. In accordance with that determination the Court can conclude 
that this action was not brought or pursued fiivotously. Therefore under the same rationale the 
Court is not going to award attorneys fees. 
Plaintiff claims that because the claims were specified in its' pleadings Defendant should 
not be awarded attomey fees, The Plaintiff cites oase law famigar to this Court in support of his 
argument that attorneys fees must be based on a statute or contract in order for an award to be 
made. Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430 (2004). This case is distinguishable from Bartschi, in 
that case there was no basis on statute put forth upon which a claim of attorney fees could be 
based until Ms. Bartschi filed a supplemental petition pursing attorney fees based on LC, 12- 
121. The Court considered the supplemented statute as a basis after the filing was made, proving 
that when a statute is cited it will be considered. In this instance the petitioner has cited several 
statutes as well as rules as a basis for their claim to attorney fees. 
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While it is obviously the better practice to speccy the attorney fees request in the 
pleading, both to preserve a claim for fees and to put the opposing side on notice of the fee 
claim, failure to do so is not fatal to a fee claim in a contested matter. Eighteen Mile Ranch v. 
Nord Excavating, 141 Idaho 716 (2005). Furthermore, in this case the Defendant did assert a 
claim for attorney fees in its Answe~ to Plaintcs Complaint as well as in its Motion for Attorney 
Fees and Costs. The Court finds that this is sufficient notice of the claims for attorney fees and 
costs. However, because the Court believes the Plaintiffs acted in good faith in bringing and 
pursuing their claim no attorney fees will be awarded and each party shall bear their own costs. 
The Court is denying attorney fees as a result of the determination that the claim was not 
unfounded and not because Defendant failed to request them properly. 
CONCLUSION: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED that based upon the above 
reasoning and the facts and reasoning contained in the Court's August 16,2007 Memorandum 
Decision and Order that the Plaintiff shall pay the amount of $72.00 as costs as a matter of right. 
No award of attorney fees to either party is granted. 
s@ Dated this $day of Octobefl007 
LR, 2.w 
Don L. Hardhe: - 
District Judge 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRAMKLIN 
1 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE ) Case No. CV-2006+390 
COMPANY, An Idaho Corporation, 1 









ZT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED pursuant to this 
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order in this case, dated August 16,2007, and this 
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying in Pard and Granting in Parr 
Defendant's Motionfor Costs and Attorney dated October 25'h 2007, the Court hereby 
enters judgment in favor of Defendant and awards them cost8 of %72,00. The Court 
further orders that each party bear their own attorney fws. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, 
pr, 
DATED this &?!ay of October, 2007. 
DON L, HARDING 
District Judge 
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By: 
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CLYDE G. NELSON 
Preston City Attorney 
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P. 0. Box 797 
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Telephone: (208) 547-2135 
Facsimile: (208) 547-21 36 
Idaho State Bar No. 1197 
Attorney for Defenda~ltlResponde~IliCross-Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLlN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE, 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, 1 
and SCOTT BECKSTEAD, Individually, 
1 CASE NO. CV-2006-390 
PlaintiffsIAppellantsiCross-Respondents ) 
1 
VS. ) NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL 
1 
CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal Corporation, ) 
Defe~~dantiRespondentiCross-Appellant ) 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED CROSS-RESPONDENTS, SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL 
ESTATE COMPANY, AN IDAHO CORPORATZ'ON, AND SCOTT BECKSTEAD, 
INDIVIDUALLY, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEY, STEVEN R. FULLER, 24 
NORTEI STATE STREET, P.O. BOX 191, PRESTON, IDAHO 83263 AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
Notice is hereby given that: 
1. m. The above named Cross-Appellant, the City of Preston, Idaho, appeals 
against the above named Cross-Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memoratldu~ll 
CROSS-APPEAL 
BECKSTEAD V. CITY OF PRESTON 
Decision and Order Denying in Part and Graltilting in Part Defeiidant's Motion for Costs and 
Attorney Fees entered in the above entitled action on the 25'h day of October, 2007, and the 
Amended Judgment denying the Cross-Appellant it's attorney fees in this action dated October 
30,2007, the Honorable Don L. Harding, District Judge, presiding. 
2. Right to Cross-Anneal That the City of Preston, Idaho has a right to cross-appeal 
to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Order and Amended Judgment described in Paragraph 1 
above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(1)(7) I.A.R. and Rule 15(b) I.A.R. 
3. Preliminary Statement of Issues 011 Appeal. ' 
(a) Whether the Cross-Appellant should have been awarded attorney fees 
pursuant to its Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees and Memorandum of Costs and Attorney 
Fees. 
(b) Whether the District court improperly denied the award of attorney 
fees to Cross-Appellant. 
4. Is a Reporter's Transcript Reauested? No. 
5. Clerk's Record. The Cross-Appellant requests that the following docunents be 
included in the clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28,IA.R. 
and those designated by the Appellant in the initial Notice of Appeal: 
(a) Cross-Appellant's Motioll for Costs and Attoriley Fees, Affidavit of Clyde 
G. Nelson in Support of said Motion, Memorandun of Costs and Attorney Fees, all briefs or 
memora~dums ubmitted to the court in support or opposition to said Motion and Memorandum, 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part Defendant's Motion for 
Costs and Attorney Fees dated October 25,2007, and Amended Judgment dated October 30, 
2007. 
CROSS-APPEAL 
BECKSTEAD V. CITY OF PRESTON 
6. Service. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of the Cross-Appeal and any request for additional clerk's 
record have been served on the Clerk of the District Court. 
(b) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee 
for preparation of the Clerk's Record of any additional documents requested on Cross-Appeal. 
(c) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuait to Rule 20 I.A.R. 
DATED this 2"d day of November, 2007 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CROSS- 
APPEAL was served on the 2"d day of November, 2007. 
On: By: 
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Franklin Coui~ty [ ] Facsimile 
39 West Oneida [ x ] Hand Delivered 
Preston, ID 83263 
Steven R. Fuller 
Attorney at Law 
24 North State 
P.O. Box 191 
Preston. ID 83263 
CROSS-APPEAL 
[ x ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
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COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, and 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually, 
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Appeal from: Sixth Judicial District, Franklin County 
Honorable Don L. Harding 
CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal 
Corporation, 
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant. 
Case number from court: CV-06-390 
NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL 
Order or judgment appealed from: Memorandum Decision and Order Denying 
in Part and Granting in Part Defendant's Motion for 
Costs and Attorney Fees and Amended Judgment 
Attorney for Appellant: Steven R. Fuller 
Steven R. Fuller Law Office 
PO Box 191 
Preston, ID 83263 
Attorney for Respondent: Clyde G. Nelson 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1 
Appeal by: Plaintiffs 
Appeal against: Defendants 
Notice of Appeal filed: September 25, 2007 
Notice of Cross Appeal filed: November 2,2007 
Appellate fee paid: Yes 
Request for additional (clerk's) record filed: No 
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No 
Was reporter's transcript requested? No 
Name of reporter: Dorothy Snarr 
Dated this gth day of November, 2007. 
V. ELLIOTT LARSEN 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
) 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE ) Case No. CV-2006-390 
COMPANY, An Idaho Corporation, 1 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
Plaintiff, 1 ORDER DENYING IN PART AND 
) GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT'S 
VS. ) MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
) FEES 
CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal Corporation,) 
) 
Defendailt. ) 
THE MATTER BEFORF: THE COURT: 
This matter is baclc before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attoiney Fees 
This case first came before the Court 011 September 8,2006, when the Plaintiff filed a co~nplaint 
against the Defendant seeking rei~nbursemellt for worlc he had performed pursuant to Preston, 
Idaho, City Ordinance $16.28.030(B). Both parties moved for S m i u y  Judgment. The Cout 
granted Defendant's Motion for Sunzmary Judgment and entered Judgment on August 16,2007. The 
Defendant timely filed the motion at bar and submitted supporting affidavits and briefs on August 
24, 2007. The Plaintiff filed an Objection to Defendant's motion for Costs andAttorrzeys Fees on 
September 6,2007. A hearing was held on October 11,2007, at which time the Court took the 
matter under advisement. After reviewing the record and the material submitted by the parties the 
Court now issues the following Memoranduni Decision and Order regarding the costs and attorney 
fees. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED: 
1. Is the Defendant entitled to an award of costs? 
2. Is the Defendant entitled to an award dattorney fees? 
ANALYSIS: 
A. The Defendant is Entitled to a Partial Award of Costs. 
Rule 54(d)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in the exercise of its 
discretion, the trial court may grant a prevailing party certain costs as a matter of right. More 
specifically the rule provides that a prevailing party may be awarded the following: 1) court 
filing fees, 2) fees for service of documents, 3) fees for expert witnesses 4) reasonable costs of 
the preparation of models, maps, pictures, photographs, or other exhibits admitted in evidence, 5) 
charges for reporting or transcribing of a deposition, and 6) charges for one copy of any 
deposition. Rule 54(d)(l)(C). Furthermore, the determillation of who is a prevailing party for 
the purposes of this rule is left to the Court's discretion. 54(d)(l)(B). The Court is to determine 
who prevails by looking at the final judgment i11 relation to the relief sought by the respective 
parties. Id. 
The record shows that 011 August 16,2007 the Court entered a judglnent in favor of the 
Defendant because he escaped all liability claimed by Plaintiff. The Defendant is therefore the 
prevailing party in this matter and as such, it is proper to award costs as a matter of right. 
However, Defendant fails to distinguish between costs claimed as a matter of right and 
discretionary costs in his Memorandum in support of Motioi? for and Memorandum ofcosts  and 
Attorney Fees. Furthermore, Rule 54(d)(l)(C) does not allow for estimated postage fees therefore 
the Court will not award the Defendant the $25.00 $costs which it deems are discretionary. 
These discretionary costs are not shown to be necessary or exceptional to this case therefore the 
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Court will not award the discretionary costs of $25.00 for estimated postage. Those costs claimed 
by Defendant in the August 24, 2007 memorandum which are allowable under Rule 54(d)(l) are 
as follows: 
i. Filing Fees for notice of appearance . $58.00 
ii. Filing Fees for answer to 1' amended co~nplaint $14.00 
Total of Costs as a Matter of Right. $72.00 
These costs qualify as costs as a matter of right under Rule 54(d)(l) and Plaintiff does not 
object to them, thus the Court will award them. 
B. The Defendant is Not Entitled to an Award of Attorneys Fees. 
Defendant claims attorney fees in the aniou~it of $7,717.50 uider I.C. $ 5  12-1 17, 12-120: 
12-121 and under I.R.C.P. 68 and 54(e)(l). The Court will address each application of the 
statutes and rules to the facts of this case. 
I.C. $ 12-1 17 provides for an award of attorney fees and costs in which a mu~iicipality is 
involved as long as the person against whom judgment was rendered acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law. I.C. $ 12-1 17(2). The Court is left to determine whether a party acted with or 
without a reasonable basis of law or fact. I.C. 5 12-1 17(1). 
The Court cannot in good conscious declare that Plaintiff acted without a reasonable 
basis of fact or law in this case. The root of the lilatter involves a city ordinance which was 
subject to differing interpretations. Varying interpretations provide a reasonable basis in law 017 
which the case was brougl~t. The facts of the case provided a reasonable basis for the 
interpretations because Plaintiff had performed the work and he felt he was entitled to 
reimbursement under his interpretation of the city ordinance. A reasonable person niay well 
interpret the City ordinance in the same manner as the Plaintiff had. 
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The allegation by Defendant that this case was pursued frivolously fails because the City 
ordinance could have been interpreted either way. It may be the very ambiguous nature of the 
ordinance which has caused the City to repeal it. A review of the facts of this case shows that 
Mr. Beckstead had conversed with one of the City's engineers who advised him of this 
ordinance. Mr. Beckstead could have reasonably relied on this information in pursing this matter 
Mr. Beckstead argued that any tolling of time restrictions should not commence until he sent a 
letter on October 22, 2004. While this argument did not convince the Court that the time 
limitations for filing a claim against the City should begin tolling from this date, this argument 
does provide a reasonable basis on which to pursue the claim legally. This was not an unfounded 
claim. 
Next the Court looks at an application of I.C. 9 12-121 and Rule 54(e)(l) to this case. 
These rules provide that a court may properly award attorney fees to a prevailing party if the 
Court determines that the opposing party brought, pursued, or defended the action frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. Rule 54(e)(l). An award of attorney fees must also be 
accompanied with factual findings providing a basis and reason for the award. Rule 54(e)(2). 
Where the record and argume~lts do not lead to the conclusion that the action was brought, 
pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation attorney fees are 
inappropriate. Tinsdale v. Tinsdale, 127 Idaho 331 (Ct. App.1995). Finally, the decision to award 
attorney fees rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Caldwell v. Idaho Youth Ranch, 
132 Idaho 120,986 P.2d 215 (1998). 
The C o u ~ t  does not feel that there is a factual basis upon which to base an award. As 
discussed above, the case was not brought fiivolously, nor does the record indicate that the case 
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was pursued uilreasonably or without foundation. The Plaintiff based his claims on facts which 
he considered would help him prevail in the matter. 
Defendant has claimed attorney fees under Rule 68 which, "includes all claims 
recoverable, including any attorneys fees awardable under Rule 54(e)(l)." See I.R.C.P. 68. As 
stated above this Court has determined that no attorney fees are to be awarded ~ulder Rule 
54(e)(l) because the action was not pursued frivolously. The Court awarded costs as a matter of 
right in the amount of $72.00 which is also allowed for under this rule in conjunction wit11 Rule 
54(d)(l). However, because an award of attorneys fees wder  Rule 68 relies upon Rule 54(e)(l) 
the Court cannot award attorneys fees utilizing this rule as it would conflict with the Courts 
decision as to whether the case was pursued frivolously. 
As stated above the Court deems that there was a reasonable basis in law and fact for this 
case to be brought and pursued. In accordance with that determination the Court call conclude 
that this action was not brought or pursued frivolously. Therefore under the same rationale the 
Court is not going to award attorneys fees. 
Plaintiff claims that because the claims were specified'in its' pleadings Defendaut sl~ould 
not be awarded attorney fees. The Plaintiff cites case law familiar to this Court in suppo~t of his 
argument that attorneys fees must be based on a statute or contract in order for ail award to be 
made. Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430 (2004). This case is distinguishable from Bartschi, in 
that case there was no basis on statute put forth upon which a claim of attorney fees could be 
based until Ms. Baifschi filed a supplemental petition pursing attorney fees based on I.C. 5 12- 
12 1. The Court considered the supplemented statute as a basis after the filing was made, proving 
that when a statute is cited it will be considered. In this instance the petitioner has cited several 
statutes as well as rules as a basis for their claim to attorney fees. 
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While it is obviously the better practice to specify the attorney fees request in the 
pleading, both to preserve a claim for fees and to put the opposing side on notice of the fee 
claim, failure to do so is not fatal to a fee claim in a contested matter. Eighleen Mile Ranch I J  
Nord Excavating, 14 1 Idaho 71 6 (2005). Furthermore, in this case the Defendant did assert a 
claim for attorney fees in its Answer lo P1aintiJ"'s Complairzt as well as in its Mofiorz f o ~  Atforney 
Fees and Costs. The Court finds that this is sufficient notice of the clain~s for attorney fees and 
costs. However, because the Court believes the Plailltiffs acted in good faith in bringing and 
pursuing their claim no attorney Cees will be awarded and each party shall bear their own costs. 
The Court is denying attorney fees as a result of the determination that the claim was not 
unfounded and not because Defendant failed to request them properly. 
CONCLUSION: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED that based upon the above 
reasoning and the facts and reasoning contained in the Court's August 16,2007 Melnorandum 
Decision and Order that the Plaintiff shall pay the amount of $72.00 as costs as a 111atter of right 
No award of attorney fees to either p&y is granted. 
fi 
Dated this g a y  of October/2007 
a - d  
Don L. Harding 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
) 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE ) CaseNo. . CV-2006-390 
1 COMPANY, An Idaho Corporation, 





CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal 1 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED pursuant to this 
Court's Memorandunz Decision and Order in this case, dated August 16, 2007, and this 
Court's Memorandunz Decision and Order Denying in Part and Granting in Part 
Defendant's Motionfor Costs and Attorney dated October 25'" 2007, the Court hereby 
enters judgment in favor of Defendant and awards them costs of $72.00. The Court 
further orders that each party bear their owl  attorney fees. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
r/, 
DATED this x q a y  of October, 2007. 
DON L. HARDING 
District Judge 
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Soda Springs, Idaho 83276 
Telephoile: (208) 547-2 135 
Facsimile: (208) 547-2136 
Steven R. Fuller 
STEVEN R. FULLER LAW OFFICE 
24 North State 
Post Office Box 191 
Preston, Idaho 83263 
Telephone: (208) 852-2680 
Facsimile: (208) 852-2683 
Method of Service: 
[ ] U.S. MailRostage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Haid Delivered 
[ ] Court Box 
[ ] U.S. MailPostage Prepaid 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivered 
[ ] Court Box 
DATED this ___ day of October, 2007. 
V. ELLIOTT LARSEN 
Clerk of the District Cou-t 
By: 
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COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, and 
S C O T  BECKSTEAD, individually, 
CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal 
Corporation, 
I Supreme Court No 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
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NOTICE OF CROSS APPEAL 
Appeal from: Sixth Judicial District, Franklin County 
Honorable Don L. Harding 
Case number from court: CV-06-390 
Order or judgment appealed from: Memorandum Decision and Order Denying 
in Part and Granting in Part Defendant's Motion for 
Costs and Attorney Fees and Amended Judgment 
Attorney for Appellant: Steven R. Fuller 
Steven R. Fuller Law Office 
PO Box 191 
Preston, ID 83263 
Attorney for Respondent: Clyde G. Nelson 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1 
Appeal by: Plaintiffs 
Appeal against: Defendants 
Notice of Appeal filed: September 25, 2007 
Notice of Cross Appeal filed: November 2,  2007 
Appellate fee paid: Yes 
Request for additional (clerk's) record filed: No 
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No 
Was reporter's transcript requested? NO 
Name of reporter: Dorothy Snarr 
Dated this gth day of November, 2007. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE 
COMPANY, an ldaho Corporation, and 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually, 
ClTY OF PRESTON, a Municipal 
Corporation, 
CASE NO. CV-06-390 
AMENDED 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ClTY OF PRESTON AND ITS ATTORNEY OF RECORD, CLYDE G. 
NELSON AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
Notice is hereby given that: 
1. A The above-named Appellants, Scott Beckstead Real Estate 
Company, an ldaho Corporation, and Scott Beckstead, individually, appeal against the 
above-named Respondent, City of Preston, a Municipal Corporation, to the ldaho 
Supreme Court from the final Judgment entered in the above-entitled action on the 16'h 
day of August, 2007, the Honorable Don L. Harding, presiding. 
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2. Riaht to Appeal. The Appellants have a right to appeal to the ldaho 
Supreme Court, and the Judgment or Order described in paragraph I above is an 
appealable judgment and order under and pursuant to Rule I l(a)(l), I.A.R. 
3. Preliminary Statement of Issues on Appeal. (I) Whether or not the 
Appellants complied with the requirements of Preston City Ordinance 16.28.030(B). (2) 
Whether or not Appellants filed a timely claim under the ldaho Tort Claims Act. 
4. Is a Reporter's Transcript Reauested? No. 
5. Clerk's Record. The Appellants request that the following documents to 
be included in the Clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 
28, I.A.R. 
(a) Second Amended Complaint dated May 2, 2007 with attachments; 
(b) Answer to Second Amended Complaint dated May 21, 2007 with 
attachments; 
(c) Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment dated June 21, 2007; 
(d) Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
dated June 21, 2007 with attachments; 
(e) Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment dated June 21,2007; 
(f) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated June 20, 2007: 
(g) Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment dated June 20,2007. 
Amended Notice of Appeal - Page 2 
(h) The following Exhibits to the Memorandum in Support of 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
(1) Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated June 19, 2007 and all exhibits attached 
to said Affidavit to  include'^-I through K. 
(2) Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson in Support of Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment dated June 19, 2007 together with all 
exhibits attached thereto from A-I  through C-3. 
(3) Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated June 19, 2007;and all exhibits attached 
thereto including A through B-2. 
(4) Affidavit of John Balls in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated June 19,2007. 
(i) Defendant's Reply Memorandum to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment dated July 23, 2007, which includes the Second Affidavit of 
Darrell Wilburn in Support of Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment dated July 20, 2007; and further includes the 
Supplementary Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson in Support of Defendant's 
Reply to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment dated July 23, 2007. 
(j) Second Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen in Response to Plaintiff's Reply 
toDefendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated July 25, 2007. 
(k) Third Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn in Response to Plaintiff's Reply to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment dated July 25, 2007. 
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( I )  Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment dated July 23, 2007. 
(m) Beckstead's Second Affidavit in Response to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment dated July 24, 2007 with attachments; 
(n) Beckstead's Third Affidavit in Response to Defendant's Reply to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment dated July 26, 2007 with 
attachments; 
(0) Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and denying Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment dated August 16,2007; 
(p) Judgment dated August 16, 2007; 
(q) Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees dated August 22, 
2007. 
(r) Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Costs and Attorney Fees dated August 22, 2007. 
(s) All attachments to Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees 
which includes a letter from Clyde G. Nelson to Steven R. Fuller dated 
February 13, 2007 (Exhibit A-I - A-2); a letter to Clyde G. Nelson from 
Steven R. Fuller dated February 15, 2007 (Exhibit B); and a fax and Offer 
of Judgment dated February 16,2007 (Exhibit C-I  4-3). 
(t) Objection to Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees 
dated September 6, 2007; 
(u) Notice of Appeal dated September 25, 2007; 
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(v) Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion and Memorandum 
of Costs and Attorneys Fees dated October 4, 2007; 
(w) Minute Entry and Order dated October I I, 2007; 
(x) Memorandum Decision and Order Denying in Part and Granting in 
Part Defendant's Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees dated October 25, 
2007; 
(y) Amended Judgment dated october 30,2007; 
(z) Notice of Cross-Appeal dated November 2,2007 
6. Service. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Clerk of 
the District Court; 
(b) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been 
paid; 
(c) That the Appellant filing fee has been paid; 
(d) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20 I.A.R. 
94 
DATED this & day of December, 2007 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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IN THE D.ISTRICT COURT OF THE-S?lXTH JUDICIAL DISTRI 
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.. . . 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ~ d 4  k , . , -' ,, 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, and 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually, 
Supreme Court No. 34644 
Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Respondents, I CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal 
Corporation, 
SECOND AMENDED 
Appeal from: Sixth Judicial District, Franklin County 
Honorable Don L. Harding 
Case number from court: CV-06-390 
Order or judgment appealed from: Memorandum Decision and Order Denying 
in Part and Granting in Part Defendant's Motion for 
Costs and Attorney Fees and Amended Judgment 
Attorney for Appellant: Steven R. Fuller 
Steven R. Fuller Law Office 
PO Box 191 
Preston, ID 83263 
Attorney for Respondent: Clyde G. Nelson 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
35pf 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1 
Appeal by: Plaintiffs 
Appeal against: Defendants 
Notice of Appeal filed:. September 25, 2007 
Notice of Cross Appeal filed: November 2, 2007 
Notice of Amended Notice of Appeal filed: December 10, 2007 
Appellate fee paid: Yes 
Request for additional (clerk's) record filed: No 
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No 
Was reporter's transcript requested? No 
Name of reporter: Dorothy Snarr 
Dated this 'toth day of December, 2007. 
V. ELLIOTT LARSEN 
B 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVJCE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED NOTICE 
OF APPEAL was served on the &day of December, 2007. 
On: By: 
Clerk of the District Court 
Franklin County, Idaho 
39 East Oneida 
Preston, ID 83263 
Clyde G. Nelson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
vs . / CLERKS CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, and 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually, 
CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal 
Corporation, 
Supreme Court No. 34644 
I, V. Elliott Larsen, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of the 
State of ldaho, in and for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction 
as, and is a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of 
the ldaho Appellate Rules. 
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, 
will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's 
Transcript and Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the ldaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court at Preston, Idaho, this 8'h day of January, 2008. 
V. ELLIOTT LARSEN 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
A I ~ I  d11111d.zq 
'rinkla Hampton, ~epu'ty Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF FRANKLIN 
Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Respondents, 1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD REAL ESTATE 
COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, and 
SCOTT BECKSTEAD, individually, 
CITY OF PRESTON, a Municipal 
Corporation, 
Supreme Court No. 34644 
I, V. Elliott Larsen, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Franklin, do hereby certify that I have personally 
served or mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the CLERK'S RECORD to each of 
the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
Steven R. Fuller 
Steven R. Fuller Law Office 
PO Box 191 
Preston, ID 83263 
Clyde G. Nelson 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 797 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
said Court this day of January, 2008. 
LERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
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